(Prof. Barbara Faccenda) How do individuals who join jihad in Syria differ from jihadists who have fought in civil wars since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?
Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to define jihadist foreign fighters (FF). To do this we adopt the description of D. Malet (2015) that they are individuals who voluntarily join Islamist rebel groups in countries other than their own. Their presence in civil wars contributes to the fragmentation and radicalization of rebel groups and ultimately makes conflict resolution very complicated. Many join groups that espouse a Salafi-jihadist ideology. Salafism adopts a puritanical view of Islam and portrays the times of the Prophet Mohammed as those of an immaculate society that must be emulated.
The number of FFs in Syria is significantly higher than that recorded in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of the 1980s and in Iraq after 2003. The scope and level of jihadist mobilization in Turkey since 2012 is an unprecedented phenomenon. According to some estimates by the Turkish police, between 1500 and 3000 Turkish citizens fought with jihadist groups abroad between 1984 and 2004. In addition, another police report dating back to April 2016 notes that about 2750 Turkish citizens they are united with Salafi-jihadist organizations such as IS and al-Nusra in Syria.
There are many reasons why the Syrian civil war, since its inception in 2011, has recorded an unprecedented level of jihadist involvement. The presumably dominant factor in the decision-making choice to join a collective action, in individuals with a strong social identity, is moral indignation, fueled by a deep sense of anger at a great political injustice suffered. Anger between individuals who perceive their collective existence is threatened likely strengthens group solidarity and authorizes punishment against foreign actors who are seen as responsible for that threat.
Islamist organizations disseminate images of suffering Muslims and, blaming Western politicians, generate moral indignation among their supporters which then translates into anger, thus portraying the jihadist mobilization as a defensive action on behalf of Muslims. Although the wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq have been characterized by high levels of civilian victimization, the violence in Syria is undoubtedly more intense and more visible, characterized by strong transnational dynamics. Another reason Syria has seen a huge number of FFs is the ease of fighting in that country compared to other battlefields. Tens of hundreds of individuals with different histories and experiences, from many countries, joined the Syrian battle across the porous Turkish-Syrian border until at least 2016. Thus, the widespread moral outrage and its intensification, together with the ease of fighting , likely reinforce and diversify the jihadist mobilization in the context of the Syrian war. What remains to be determined, to answer our initial question, is how exactly the current wave of jihadist FF differs from previous waves in terms of demographic characteristics. Rather than looking for a single all-encompassing factor, it seems much more productive to acknowledge that the factors that make it possible to recruit different types of individuals are different. The new generations of jihadist FFs are less likely to have histories of Islamist political activism behind them and are veterans of other conflicts. Differences in the characteristics of Islamic State (IS) and non-Islamic State recruits suggest distinct reasons that are due to peculiar organizational efforts of propaganda and visual representations. IS has developed a reputation as a vengeance organization, employing extreme violence in retaliation for Muslim suffering. This makes it a general call to all Sunni Muslims to join the Caliphate by activating their sense of anger and moral indignation to justify such violence. In this respect, the IS recruitment strategy seems consistent with altruistic theories of punishment that have strong evolutionary roots in human behavior. While considering the violence of IS to be excessive, non-IS Salafist-jihadist organizations (e.g. Al Qaeda) are aware that revenge plays an important role in attracting large numbers of Muslims from all walks of life. These organizations, however, aim to recruit militants with more solid religious commitment and training. These organizational differences are reflected in the different types of individuals who join the IS and non-IS organizations.
If we compare the pre-Syrian jihadist FFs and Syria, the "Syria group" tends to have a higher number of Kurdish women and recruits, however the FFs in this group are less likely married and have no history of activism Islamist politician or have fought in previous jihadist battlefields. While the initial wave of jihadists who went to Syria included a number of individuals who had either a criminal history or a history of Islamist activism, the profile of Turkish jihadist FF, for example, in Syria, became, over the course of the time, less distinct. One potential reason for this trend is that IS has addressed invitations to all Muslims, with no attention to their demographics or religious knowledge.
Post-Syria jihadism escapes superficial categorizations, making the search for specific jihadist traits a futile exercise. Policies to combat and dismantle jihadist networks based on precise intelligence would be much more effective than behavioral analysis policies. The violent and reductionist ideology of the IS must be perceived as a crucial factor in its ability to recruit meaningful support. Instead of dismissing IS ideology as a relic of medieval barbarism, it is important to point out its internal contradictions and inconsistencies that characterize its indiscriminate violence and the political system it seeks to build in the place of pious Muslims.