The Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic - Copasir - in the context of the cycle of hearings on the insurance banking system listened AISE, Banca D'Italia, Ivass, Ubi Banca, Mediobanca, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. The audition of Unicredit.
In the context of the competences of Copasir relating to security and national interest is gradually forming a sensitive and aware concern about dynamics that could intercept the country's shared interest in the future.
Recent news, in some ways somewhat predictable, accentuates the concerns already expressed by the Committee regarding the possible control outside the national borders of primary banking and insurance institutions already recognized as one of the major holders of Italian sovereign debt.
Since the news is public and clear and remembering the recent implementation of the legislation on the defense of the strategic assets of the country, we think there may be an autonomous activation of the bodies in charge aimed at ensuring that the aforementioned institutions remain within a control and management system Italian. We believe that, today in particular, the "Country System" needs not to be depleted of strategic cornerstones in favor of actors who pursue interests other than national ones.
Su Investireoggi.it, Giuseppe Timpone explained the question of our public debt in a truly exhaustive way.
Italian public debt closed 2019 at € 2.409 billion, up 1,2% year-on-year. Now, the numbers chasing each other day by day on the forecasts for the end of the year give the exploding stock close to 2.600 billion. The deficit is expected to rise to double figures, due to the collapse of the GDP for the Coronavirus emergency. Remaining the December data, we know that the largest share is held by Italian banks with 26,5%, followed by just over 19% of insurance companies and other domestic institutions. The sum of the holdings between the Bank of Italy and the ECB completes the podium, at 19,5%. In the latter case, we speak of the BTp purchased on the secondary market within the "quantitative easing". Italian households and businesses, on the other hand, stop at 5,8%. In the early XNUMXs, they held almost all of the BTp issued by the Treasury.
That 28,8% remains in foreign hands, of which we must take into account the share invested by the Italians themselves in managed savings companies based in Ireland and Luxembourg, net of which we would stop at 500 billion, just over 20%. Here, this is the actual share invested abroad on our debt. In 2010, before the spread crisis exploded, it stood at over 50%. And even more interestingly, foreign investors continue to sell and Bankitalia data in May with reference to the stock at the end of March will signal us something more interesting about the changes that occurred in the first months of this year regarding the nationality of creditors.
And if we go to deepen the composition of foreign investors interested in our debt, we discover that a relevant portion is represented by the so-called Hedge funds, that is, hedge funds, with a generally short time horizon for their investments and which exploit price movements.
This explains the high volatility of BTp compared to sovereign bonds in the rest of the Eurozone. As soon as prices rise substantially, these funds get rid of our government bonds, making returns rise; vice versa, when prices touch very low points. Their goal is almost never to keep them in the portfolio until maturity, a bit like what happens with "junk" bonds issued by emerging states, banks and companies with low creditworthiness.
If all this is true, it becomes difficult to imagine that alone we would be able to issue debt for over 500 billion this year, of which up to over 180 billion net. If they flee from abroad, this new debt will have to be borne by Italian banks, insurance companies and savers. Still, the former seem to have played their part far too much in recent years, so much so that the ECB Supervisory Authority does not welcome their "excessive" exposures to the state budget and from within it there are critical voices in this regard, with Germans , Dutch and Finnish, in particular, to demand more restrictive rules on detentions.
The same families do not seem to want to hear it, if it is true that to date they prefer to keep over 1.500 billion euros deposited in non-interest-bearing accounts in the bank, rather than lending them to the state perceiving a minimum return, either for the feared short-term liquidity requirement (a sign of pessimism). about the future), you want for the lack of trust in the state. But if nobody wants to buy, apart from the self-binding ECB, this huge amount of BTp to be issued to who will go? The risk that in order to attract demand, the Treasury will have to demand ever lower prices, that is to offer increasing returns, is more than concrete. It would be unsustainable for state coffers. We cannot afford to burden public finances with an additional, unproductive, expense item.
For this reason, in the last two years various formulas have been studied, from individual savings accounts to "Irredeemable" BTp and those related to the performance of the Italian economy. Before that, the then Minister of Economy, Giulio Tremonti, had launched BTp Italia, which debuted under the Monti government, a retail bond aimed at attracting new demand from families. It was not enough, which is why we are really fruit-based also in terms of imagination. You can exempt the new financial instruments hypothesized for tax purposes, you can change some of their features to make them as attractive as possible, you can also invent a tempting name, but if the capital doesn't come, what do you do?
BTp compulsory investment
It will be a coincidence, but in these weeks in which the extent of the current fiscal crisis emerges with increasing clarity, we are talking about forced loan, a patrimonial which would not entail any explicit expropriation, as the imposition of a compulsory investment in BTp and, of course, interest-bearing. The plan is not presented in this capacity, on the contrary the "voluntary" nature of the loan is clarified in response to an explicit appeal from the state, but it is not clear why the Italian saver should respond to it, when he has so far preferred to stay away from debt, even in the face of relatively high returns. Will the patrio spirit alone be able to do a lot, a bit when the Italian families en masse delivered the gold to the Duce to finance the war?
For many reasons, the assets we have discussed in recent days have proved impractical and unwanted on a political level. It would be better to mask it with an investment in BTp initially only requested and in the case of sufficient responses, imposed by force. It would be said to the Italians that they would be drawing on the "dormant" capitals of the wealthiest to put them at the service of the community, but it would still be an expropriation, however limited in time and fruitful.
The only alternative would be to resort to the state-saving fund, subjecting itself to a humiliating European commissioner, with unpredictable political consequences. The money to finance the huge budget "hole" will have to come from Italy itself, moreover in a phase of strong contraction of the GDP, in which the overall level of savings will hardly be able to increase and voluntarily cover the state's needs.