by Andrea Pinto

In recent months, in the strategic competition between the United States and China, Beijing has achieved a series of successes that have not gone unnoticed, neither in Asia nor in Western governments. The Trump administration's shift toward the People's Republic is fueling an increasingly widespread narrative in China: that of an America less determined to contain China's rise and more inclined to a pragmatic, if not overtly transactional, approach.

The signs are multiple. Washington has toned down its criticism of the Chinese Communist Party In a key strategy document, he reopened the sale of advanced chips, which until recently had been considered a red line, and kept a surprisingly low profile in the face of pressure from Beijing against Japan, a historic US ally in Asia, for reaffirming its support for Taiwan.

For Beijing, all of this indicates only one thing: Donald Trump no longer seems willing to fight China on ideological, technological and diplomatic groundsA shift in approach that is being interpreted at home as a strategic victory. Chinese commentators and analysts openly speak of American decline and the irreversible rise of Chinese power.

The White House's decision to authorize the sale of some advanced semiconductors to China had a strong symbolic impact. Zhou Hongyi, a well-known Chinese technology executive, commented on social media that China's "unstoppable technological growth" had now "pushed the United States against the wall." Global Times, a newspaper close to the Communist Party, has indicated the new American National Security Strategy — more focused on the Western Hemisphere than on China — as proof that Washington recognizes its global downsizing.

According to this interpretation, the United States has understood that it cannot afford the costs of a prolonged confrontation with Beijing. This view is reinforced by Trump's silence while China intensified its diplomatic and military pressure on Japan: summoning diplomats, canceling flights, restricting tourism, and increasing air strikes near Japanese airspace, in response to Tokyo's position on Taiwan.

It is the most evident face of what many Chinese analysts define Trump's transactional diplomacyIn this scheme, China is no longer a systemic enemy to be contained, but a great power to negotiate with, exchanging economic concessions for political stability.

This approach is clearly stated in the new National Security Strategy, published on 4 December, which redefines the Sino-US rivalry as a predominantly economic competition, not as a clash between political systems or worldviews. The stated goal is "to establish a mutually beneficial economic relationship with Beijing."

For the first time in over thirty years, the document It does not contain explicit criticism of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime or calls for the protection of human rightsThis absence marks a profound break with previous administrations. As Caroline Costello of the Atlantic Council observes, China's push to make the international system more favorable to autocracies "no longer figures among Washington's strategic priorities."

According to Xin Qiang, an expert on Sino-American relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, the Trump administration has taken note of the fact that “Playing the ideological card to change China is neither possible nor realistic.”Policy towards Beijing, he argues, is now driven by profit rather than values.

This approach also explains the controversial decision of loosen export controls on key artificial intelligence technologies, allowing Nvidia to sell its second-most powerful chip to China. A deal from which the U.S. government will collect 25% of the proceeds, according to Trump himself. A decision that critics see as a short-sighted trade-off: immediate gains in exchange for long-term strategic risks.

The new course has its roots in the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping last October, when Washington backtracked on tariffs after Beijing blocked rare earth exports and reduced purchases of American soybeans, demonstrating its full economic leverage. Since then, contacts have intensified, culminating in Trump's announcement of a possible visit to Beijing in April.

According to David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American strategy is calibrated to leave Trump the maximum negotiating margin ahead of that meeting. Harsher language on China, he argues, could have limited his freedom of maneuver.

From Beijing's point of view, the transition from “containment” to “competition” represents a conceptual victoryIt reinforces the idea, dear to the Chinese leadership, that no country should interfere in another's internal affairs and that universal values, starting with human rights, do not exist.

But this greater American tolerance also offers Xi Jinping room for a more aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific regionThe recent joint Sino-Russian exercises near Japan, including nuclear bombers, are a prime example. Beijing calls them a demonstration of "determination and capability" in the face of regional security challenges.

There are those, however, who urge caution. Some Chinese analysts believe that the American détente is only temporarySocial scientist Meng Weizhan argues that Washington is simply toning down its position while rebuilding its economic and technological advantage. A strategy that, not coincidentally, recalls Deng Xiaoping's famous motto: "Hide your strength and bide your time."

In this reading, the essence of American strategy has not changed: maintain its dominant position and prevent China from overtaking it. Only, the clash is postponed.

The question that remains open is whether this phase of apparent pragmatism will really lead to a more stable relationship between the two superpowers, or whether it is rather a tactical truce before an even tougher competitionFor now, however, one thing is certain: Beijing feels it has the upper hand. And it's doing nothing to hide it.