In mid-August, General Khalifa Haftar, military commander of the Lybian National Army (LNA), traveled to Moscow. The visit did not arouse much interest, it seemed like one of the classic foreign visits to the Russian capital. The visit began at the airport with the meeting of the Libyan Ambassador to Russia. A meeting, according to many, "unusual", given that the Ambassador represents that part not appreciated by Gen. Haftar - Government of National Unity, chaired by Fayez al-Sarraj -, recognized by the UN and therefore by the international community.
General Haftar wanted to avoid the fuss of diplomatic protocol and immediately meet the Russian delegation. The discussions would have touched on the opportunity to be able to ease the UN sanctions on the arms embargo.
Interesting but implausible arguments. Moscow had already expressed itself on these issues and had repeatedly affirmed its commitment to uphold international obligations and not to change its position. On condition of anonymity, some sources close to Gen. Haftar stated that the purpose of the visit was, in reality, to inform Moscow on issues addressed in the peace talks held in Paris last July.
Mohamed B. Almontaser, a Libyan political analyst in London, thinks Haftar's visit to Moscow can only undermine the peace process. "Haftar feels encouraged by the new wave of high-level contacts with Paris and Moscow, and will maintain and cultivate these contacts to increase his sole ambition.Almontaser said, referring to Haftar's desire to become the Libyan version of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. "His remarks after the two mini-summits seem to indicate his disagreement with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and his categorical refusal to work under civilian political leadership".
It is clear that Almontaser's sympathies are for the Tripoli government, but his reasoning makes sense, as does Haftar's trip to Moscow which allowed him to earn points in foreign policy and political points at home. Haftar's attempts to strengthen his position with the support of Moscow - even if such support has not always been evident - has been central to the strategy in the international arena.
In turn, Moscow has its own reasons for inviting the Libyan military fort. The Kremlin is trying to build a solid path for interacting with the administration of French President Emmanuel Macron. Moscow is objective and welcomes Macron's proactive stance in the Middle East, compared to his predecessor Francois Hollande. Position appreciated by the Kremlin and herald of certain future relations with the French.
Meanwhile, the Libyan peace process is apparently stalled. If this were not the case, Tripoli and Tobruk would have jointly asked for the arms embargo to be lifted. Instead, the parties accuse themselves directly or indirectly of obstructing the peace process.
Haftar told France 24: "Sarraj is a good man", but added: "He cannot implement what he has accepted". In eastern Libya, which controls Haftar, people describe Sarraj as a weak politician and often cite his failure to expel the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda from the areas his government controls.
There is of course an opposite perspective. As Almontaser observes, "there are many obstacles to the peace process and dialogue at this time. The Eastern Bloc still strongly opposes the political agreement, “the pact signed in 2015 that created unity of government".
Thus supporters of one side, in essence, criticize the leader of the other as weak and unable to consolidate power. However, Tripoli supporters also recognize that the western regions of Libya still pose a deadly threat to the peace process.
Almontaser stated: "There are also a number of militias in the west of the country - who are afraid of losing their influence and being subject to law for their war crimes - who are taking a tough stand against any process or reconciliation that doesn't include them ". It turns out, therefore, that many actors in the field would prefer that the pacification process derail rather than go to completion.
Another issue is the Misrata militia. Despite their absence from the Abu Dhabi and Paris peace talks, the militias remain of crucial importance in Libyan military and political arenas. Sarraj's supporters accepted their key role in the inter-Libyan dialogue, but Haftar never accepted them.
The ties of the Misrata militias with Moscow are not hidden either, so sources close to the LNA report who have asked for anonymity. Then they say that it depends on which Russian side will have contact with the Misrata militia. If it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nothing will happen, if it is the Ministry of Defense or the military agencies, the LNA side will not accept interference and serious problems could arise. Nor should it be overlooked that some representatives of the Misrata militias recently made a visit to Qatar to announce the decision to set up their own army and said they were refusing agreements with their eastern Libyan counterpart. The above would further aggravate the situation on the ground.
In this complicated situation, Moscow seems to be the only one capable of bringing the two sides together and providing a decisive support to the peace process. Moscow is the only one who can dialogue and influence the opposing sides.
While the scenario seems difficult in Libya's current highly institutionalized and extremely pluralistic political system, Haftar may pursue presidential ambitions, or so some people in his entourage think.
However, there are many doubts whether Tripoli, the Misrata militias and other parties involved can really accept him as head of state. It is not just the bloodshed it caused, but also the anti-Islamism, which has become the cornerstone and ideology of Haftar's army, which scares many (basically moderate) politicians from the regions of western Libya. .
Meanwhile, the negotiating process could allow the military commander to evolve into a political leader, only if he is able to present a more or less clear political platform. It could actually provide the basis for a dialogue with other stakeholders.
Considering all this, it seems that Moscow's support can really contribute positively to the Libyan political process.
Meanwhile, yesterday in Versailles France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Libya, Nigeria, Chad and Lady Pesc, Federica Mogherini agreed on the "road map" for the issue of migrants, with the involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Unhcr ). In this regard, Premier Gentiloni also asked for greater cooperation from the countries of the European Union.
For Libya, the "legal" representative Fayez al-Sarraj was present, who, as seen on the field, does not represent all of Libya, on the contrary.
Most Libyans do not accept what Sarraj approves and countersigns, which will make it really difficult to pursue results. General Haftar is a reality and exists because he has an important and crucial following and territory of Libya. Not foreseeing his presence yesterday was a mistake that could make any measure signed and approved by Sarraj fail. General Haftar, as seen, is supported by Moscow which could even bring the militias of Misrata closer to him. This would give him real power over the nation. Gaddafi "docet".
In some cases the rules of diplomacy must also make calculations with contingent situations on the ground. And then Macron, how many games are you playing?
By Massimiliano D'Elia
Source: http://www.al-monitor.com