"The political and military lessons identified for Afghanistan will serve for the new scenarios of operations in Africa. It is necessary to resort to history and its teachings, such as those inherited from the Roman Empire, which gained security from threats from the south by strengthening the countries of North Africa". Thus, on Formiche.net, the general Pasquale PRECIOUS, former Chief of Staff of theair Force and today president ofSafety Observatory di Eurispes.
The general analyzes the twenty years of military campaign in Afghanistan by reporting the lessons learned in the African context, a place where the Italian military presence is progressively increasing today in missions aimed at fighting regional terrorism with the hope of being able to one day have control of migratory flows towards the old continent and much more.
The general writes. The long war in Afghanistan that began after 11 September 2001 with the aim of overthrowing al Qaeda terrorism and eliminating Taliban governance is coming to an end. After almost twenty years of fighting, training and collateral damage, the result achieved was much lower than initial expectations: Afghanistan will be left in the hands of the government with the Taliban ready at the gates to regain the temporarily lost "governance".
Italy, also in the context of international coalitions, will end the Afghan period with over 50 dead, many seriously injured and a financial cost of around 8 billion euros. The political results achieved in Afghanistan after twenty years of commitment have not lived up to expectations. In addition, al Qaeda terrorism has spread to other areas of the globe and a new radical fundamentalism has taken hold (ISIS), especially in Africa. The military action that was to conquer the minds and hearts of the Afghan population did not produce the desired changes in the system.
Historically, the United States and its allies leave Afghanistan with the same negative results as the USSR in the 79-89 commitment period, but with higher expenses that have had a high impact on public debts, thus weakening the processes of competition. international in place. In Afghanistan there was nothing to win and nothing was won, the contrast to opium production was also lost. The most appropriate decisions are those that are able to best evaluate the consequences over time and on the ground in relation to the history and anthropology of the area concerned. The political and military lessons identified for Afghanistan cannot be overlooked in the presence of new scenarios of operations in Africa.
The situation in Africa. Africa is a mess of instability. The Sahel represents the "crossroads of African instability with religious claims supported by armed groups affiliated with al Qaeda linked to the marginalization of the northern regions of Mali"(Ispi). In addition to religious conflicts, there are also armed ones between opposing factions due to ethnic and political problems. The risk of violence in the region is very high and since 2010 there has been an increasing trend of new crises, including the Tuareg and Islamist rebellion in northern Mali (Ansar al-Dine-Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Greater Sahara, Jama'at Nusrat al -Islam wal-Muslim, al-Mulathamun Battalion) and the Boko Haram guerrillas in northeastern Nigeria.
Historically, the attacks of Al Qaeda began in 1998 in Nairobi and with the Arab revolutions of 2011 in Africa also the affiliates of the Islamic state of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. In Mali, 94% of the population (about 20 million) is of Muslim faith with more than ten ethnic groups, 13 local languages in addition to the official French one. The last coup (five total since 1960) took place in the recent summer of 2020. In this region, more than four times the size of Italy, where the risk of infectious diseases is defined as very high, identity and radicalism Islamic have played an important role in the push for armed mobilization for the opposition of even local interests.
In the region there is the commitment of the UN, since 2013 with theMinusma operation with results not yet visible, of the European Union with theOperation Eutm-M for the training of the armed forces, perceived by the locals "too theoretical". The French counter-terrorism mission (which has already reported 50 victims), called Barkhane, is losing the support of the Malian population, moreover the French commitment in Mali is fueling internal debates in France on the political and military expediency to continue the mission in consideration of the few results achieved. According to some Malian political parties, "only the people of Mali can put an end to the ongoing conflict".
The situation in Mali, therefore, is similar to that of Afghanistan at the beginning of the "Global war on Terrorism". Some analysts have called Mali the "new Afghanistan" of Africa. Information is circulating for a new European operation called "Takuba" for the fight against jihadist cells in the Sahel region, including Mali, in the wake of the Barkhane operation already underway. Germany and Spain did not join the invitation, while the 'Italy would seem willing to use special forces, it is said for mentoring, in communion with the French ones, promoters of the initiative. The area of operations is defined by sector analysts "epicenter of global Jihad ".
Moreover, due to the fight against iihadism, military operations by a large coalition with many powers involved are still underway in some areas of Iraq and Syria, the results of which do not appear to be certain or yet definitive. The opening now of another operation to combat Jihadism with the participation of a number of countries and minimal forces raises some doubts on the effectiveness of the global strategy to combat the terrorist phenomenon.
Italy, in particular, should question itself, after Afghanistan and with the pandemic still underway, on the lines to be followed to ensure levels of national security adequate to the new world framework that sees a very demanding strategic competition to win the future. The stabilization of the international framework will not be without surprises. It is necessary to resort to history and his teachings, especially those inherited from the ancient Roman Empire due to threats from the South. The security of the Empire was obtained by strengthening the countries of North Africa and not by dispersing the efforts in areas of little commercial or strategic interest.
La Libya, la tunisia andAlgeria, just to name a few, are the countries of strategic interest for the security not only of Italy but for the whole of Europe. Military operations, even if peacekeeping, have very high costs, even for the G7 countries which, after the pandemic, had to raise the public debt to levels never seen before. Military operations have certain costs, but uncertain returns. Il Mali represents the new "Quagmire of trouble" in which not to slip in so as not to bequeath to the next generations not only a large financial debt, but also a strategic debt in foreign policy.