Roberto Bongiomi on Il Sole 24 ore made an interesting editorial on Libya's oil extraction capacities. Capabilities that you exploit "peacefully" would make the African country among the first in the world for quantity and quality of crude oil. At the end of August, a promising resumption of oil production was announced, which had risen above a million barrels per day, close to the maximum since the beginning of the year, a pity that in the outskirts of Tripoli the clashes between rival militias began, still ongoing, despite the weak cease fire. If in 2018 Libya once again missed the opportunity to return to the club of large crude oil exporters, the reasons are always the same: political instability, internal rivalries, intermittent strikes and, above all, the militias that do not hesitate to occupy oil terminals, often blocking operations to reclaim a slice of the rich energy pie.
Yet despite the chronic instability, Libyan oil, but also gas, is still the throat of many energy companies. Because it's very precious, it's close, and it's a lot. Libya, specifies the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, has proven reserves equal to 48,4 billion barrels of oil, the largest in Africa. There would therefore be the conditions for transforming Libya, the fourth largest African country, but with just 7 million inhabitants, into the Switzerland of Africa. But is not so. Before the revolt against Gaddafi, the country produced 1,65 million barrels a day (mbg). After a startling start, starting from 2014 the production has fallen, collapsing, in the worst moments, to 20 thousand barrels. For years, several armed groups have not hesitated to block the oil terminals, to attack pipelines, to threaten the deposits to get their counter-matches: often money or the release of their fighters detained in the prisons of the two respective Governments that since 2014 split the country in two, not hesitating to fight in times of greatest crisis. Yet Libya's potential is first-rate. In the 70 years it produced three million barrels a day. With the appropriate investments, he would have the credentials to surpass that level. Within the 2022, the national oil company, the Noe, aims to bring the production to 2,3 million barrels a day (target that would require investments for 18 billions of dollars). But who is willing to invest in projects in a hostage country of a mosaic of militias? Precisely because of the collapse of production in recent years (in the 2013 oil revenues amounted to 40 billion dollars, in the 2016 to 4,6 billion), the Government of Tripoli has faced a serious economic crisis. On the other hand, Libya is petro-dependent: the hydrocarbon sector represents 95% of government revenues and 96% of exports in value. In the presence of completely inefficient institutions, for some years it has been the Central Bank, the only truly functioning entity, which has been managing the resources by dividing them between the two "rival Libya". Also because in a country that has doubled in all, with two Governments and two administrations, the Cyrenaica Executive has well thought of creating a branch of the Noe in Benghazi, completely independent, even if not recognized by the international community. Every time he tried to sell the oil extracted in Cyrenaica, the oil tankers were stopped offshore by foreign military ships and shipped to Tripoli. Before June 2016 the two strategic terminals in the Oil Crescent, Ras Lanuf and al-Sidra were under the control of the Petroleum Facility Guard, led by former rebel Ibrahim Jidran, hero in the eyes of his supporters, but for his rivals a shady figure which was enriched by selling smuggled crude oil. Self-proclaimed guarantor of the security of the terminals, in theory allied to the Government of Tripoli, Jidran has often had an ambiguous role. An intolerable situation for the powerful general Khalifa Haftar, the lord of Cyrenaica supported by Egypt, Russia and gradually also by France. Haftar has always accused Tripoli of bad management of national resources. In June of the 2016, its powerful army occupied the Crescent terminals. Losing them again last June and regaining them shortly thereafter. At the end of June Haftar decided to deliver the ports to the Noe. To that of Benghazi. Inappropriate choice. As if he wanted to be open to dialogue, and hoping that the elections sponsored by France will take place after the (verbal) agreement torn by President Emmanuel Macron in May, he decided to return them to the Noe in Tripoli. Reopening the activities of the ports of the Mezzaluna, the production is thus traced back to the 600000 barrels of July to more than a million. But who can rule out that Haftar does not regain control of the terminals? In the other Libya, in Tripolitania, where the Italian Eni mainly operates, the gas and crude oil fields are continuing their activities normally. But even in this case a headshot of rival militias could precipitate the situation. If Eni continues to remain the leading Libyan operator, the French Total appears determined to consolidate its presence. In March, it purchased 16% of the Waha field (in Cyrenaica) from the American Marathon Oil for 450 million dollars. An agreement however not considered valid by the government of Tripoli and the Noe.