The defense that is not there from Putin's hypersonic missiles

(by Andrea Pinto) Moscow announced that it has used i Kinzhal, hypersonic ballistic missile with nuclear or conventional capability that is launched from a modified Mig-31. It is one of the six "next generation" weapons cited by Putin in his March 1, 2018 speech. A demonstration to the world that Russian hypersonic technology is mature and usable on battle changes. A tactical slap in the face of Western superpowers which, to date, not only have not developed similar capabilities but do not even have suitable missile defenses to avert a possible threat. Un gap capacitive difficult to fill in the short term.

The Kinzhal has a declared range of 1.500-2.000 km with a nuclear or conventional payload of 480 kg. It is 8 meters long, with a diameter of one and a launch weight of approximately 4.300 kg. Similar in size to the 9M723 Iskander short-range ballistic missile, it nevertheless has distinctive features, including a redesigned tail section and reduced rudders.

After launch, the Kinzhal quickly accelerates to Mach 4 and can reach speeds of up to Mach 10 (12.350 km / h). This speed, combined with the missile's erratic flight path and high maneuverability, can complicate its interception.

THE OTHER WEAPONS OF PUTIN. About two years ago Putin said to the nation: "we are invincible". The reference was due to the success of military tests on new weapons developed in recent years with hypersonic technology. Let's talk, as the General Pasquale Preziosa su ants.net, of intercontinental missiles with hypersonic capabilities Avangard (HGV- Hypersonic Glide Vehicle) and combat systems based on the “Peresvet” Laser for Air defense and Missile defense. Super-heavy ballistic ICBMs will be operational this year, Sarmat, capable of evading US ABM defenses and capable of carrying up to 24 HGV warheads. The number of combat aircraft equipped with hypersonic missiles Kinzhal (two thousand kilometers of range, with speeds up to Mach 10) will increase, as will the deployment of cruise missiles Kalibr (subsonic-supersonic) on combat ships. The hypersonic missile Zircon (one thousand kilometers, Mach 8-9) anti-ship (invisible to radar) will enter service shortly.

Russia has developed a more modern system of large combat torpedoes for submarines, the Poseidon ( "tsunami apocalypse torpedo”) Capable of hitting coastal targets with thermonuclear weaponry (2 Megaton) and the named system burevestnik (Petrel), nuclear-powered cruise missile.

Defense against the threat of hypersonic missiles

La Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in 2019, he writes insideover, showed with a demonstration video how to identify, track and intercept hypersonic re-entry vehicles or Hgv (Hypersonic Glide Vehicle). The video shows what is the solution of United States to protect a target from the threat of a hypersonic warhead ballistic missile through a "multilayer solution".

The MDA document, entitled "Mda Concept for Regional Hypersonic Missile Defense: Technology to Defeat the Threat", Describes the plans of the Pentagon to protect the United States, its forces and allies against regional hypersonic threats by using a multi-layered solution to defend against the next generation of hypersonic gliding vehicles. It is not a multilayer system like the one that defends the United States from ballistic missiles and employs the GMD, the Thaad, the Patriots and the Aegis, but it is based on a concept bidimensional (surface and space) employing the missile systems embarked on class destroyers Arleigh Burke. It therefore pivots, as far as the interception vehicles are concerned, on the system Aegis on board and on two types of carriers: the missile Sm-6 Standard and the gpi (Glide Phase Interceptor), a weapon still under development aimed at hitting HGV warheads during the glide phase of their trajectory. Standard 6, on the other hand, is used to hit targets in their terminal phase.

The Aegis Combat System embarked, therefore, yes it will integrate with both space and ground sensor systems in turn linked with various integrated fire control networks and sensors to have the ability to extend the Arleigh Burke's arm beyond the range of their onboard radars. Something that has already been seen recently put into practice byUS Navy, albeit with another objective than a missile carrier.

During the tutorial formally known as Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21 (UxS IBP 21) held off California in April 2021, a whole series of assets manned e unmanned (including balloons) has been set up to allow an Sm-6 missile launched by the destroyer Uss John Finn to hit its surface target far beyond its "field of view" made up of the naval unit's sensors. . A "blind" launch guided by space assets and integrated airplanes that demonstrated the possibility of engaging a target far beyond the radar range of a naval unit.

A fact that finds particular application precisely with regard to Hgv warheads. These vehicles, in fact, in addition to traveling at very high speeds (greater than Mach 5), can perform maneuvers to evade the radar bubbles of naval units (or land systems). A peculiarity that, if combined with the lower flight profile than that of a normal ballistic missile, makes it difficult to discover, track and therefore the possibility of interception. The low flight profile, in fact, it greatly reduces the discovery times: the radars must necessarily follow the Earth's curvature and a missile that flies "low" and very fast enters the cone of radio waves much later than another in a ballistic trajectory.

The video describes a scenario in which they are launched four vectors hypersonic to the address of an aircraft carrier, and it is shown broadly how the "multilevel" system identifies the launches, tracks them and intervenes to command the interception.

It can in fact be seen that two satellites of the constellation Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (Hbtss) they detect the launches and follow the HGVs while they are still attached to their boosters and fly along a ballistic trajectory typical of the initial phase. These space sensors then continue to track vehicles after they separate from the boosters, providing a tracking for fire control systems that will activate in later stages for actual interception.

In 2019, as reported The War Zone, Mda has launched a tender to build these missile defense satellites by awarding initial development contracts to four companies: Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leidos and L3Harris. In January 2021, he chose Northrop Grumman and L3Harris to move on to the next stage. The goal is to have the first HBTSS satellite deployed in 2023. It is unclear how many total satellites should form the Hbtss constellation, which is just one of many in the chain of early warning that missile defense will put into service in the near future. Mda says the tracking and targeting information from HBTSS sensors will provide information to the Ballistic Missile Defense Overhead Persistent Infrared Architecture (BOA), an architecture of various integrated sensors. This data, which is continuously updated almost in real time, is then used to track the HGV warheads. The tracking information is then relayed to the destroyers via the Boa system, as well as via the separate network Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2Bmc), using satellite communications.

With all this information, one or more Arleigh Burke can then initiate the so-called wiretapping "Engage on Remote"(EoR), which use only location data and targeting external, rather than its own radars to direct the interceptor towards the target as we have already had occasion to mention. They can also conduct so-called wiretapping "Launch on Remote”, Where anti-hypersonic interceptors are launched based on information from targeting coming from external sensors, but the ship's radars provide updates of late engagement.

It is also expected that HBTSS will be able to target radars directly on ships equipped with the Aegis system to allow them to point in the direction of an incoming threat that is outside their scan range. This will help them be able to see a target immediately when it comes within range.

What we have seen, which all seems very functional even if the ability of an Sm-6 to intercept a hypersonic vehicle in the terminal phase is still to be established, has a notable peculiarity: it is based a lot on components, in particular the dense network of space sensors capable of reliably identifying and tracking Hgv vectors, which have yet to enter service. Likewise the missile "killer”Main, the Gpi, is still under development and it is not known when it will enter service (there are not even test launches).

This innovative missile defense system, however, seems to have been studied only for HGVs, which are particular hypersonic missiles, but we do not know if it is also valid for those hypersonic cruise missiles such as the Zircon or Kinzhal Russians, who operate, as seen in Ukraine, with a very different concept and who always travel at very high speeds.

The defense that is not there from Putin's hypersonic missiles