"Intelligence vacuum cleaner": this is how its security service is defined by the Dutch

On March 21, the Dutch people voted in favor of the new law on security and intelligence services, in Dutch Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (or WIV). Public discontent over the new intelligence act came rather late. In August, a group of students from Amsterdam managed to collect over ten thousand signatures for a consultative referendum on the Intelligence and Security Services Act, to which the House of Representatives gave its agreement on February 14 and the Senate on July 11, 2017. Students were supported by a variety of civil liberties organizations, including Amnesty International and Bits of Freedom, and filed petitions with 300.000 signatures. By law (which has been abolished in the meantime) the Dutch government was required to hold a consultative referendum on the new law.
The conclusions they will draw from a "yes" or "no" majority based on a turn-out percentage are unclear. Some coalition party leaders, such as Christian Democrat parliamentary leader Sybrand Buma, have said they will ignore the referendum altogether. A little late for the party (parliament debated and accepted the new law throughout 2017). Students are equally concerned with digital civil rights groups who want to start a discussion about the "wiretapping law" or "vacuuming ability", more often referred to as the "police law" in popular metaphors.

Although this complex law has been made more comprehensive to solve a variety of intelligence issues, the discussion has focused solely on the "mail network": the interception of communication traffic that traverses fiber optic cables and consequences of the application of this special power for the privacy of Dutch citizens.
The fact that activists choose a metaphor to specify their objections to this abstract intelligence method is understandable: in Article 48 of the law, this authority is described as "wiretapping, receiving, recording and listening to any form of telecommunication or transfer of data "by means of automated work, regardless of where this occurs". Ever since 1913, when the first secret services in the Netherlands were institutionalized, supporters and opponents have been discussing their secret and invisible work making use of captivating metaphors in order to make it more tangible, visible and therefore understandable. The Homeland Security Service (BVD), established in 1949, has been characterized by some as an irrelevant "gossip club", and by others as a powerful "Fouche tool", a "Giant in the shadows", or as a "secret barbed "" iron fire "within which Dutch democracy would be blocked.
The actors involved chose these metaphors for a particular reason. Members of parliament who felt too much money was being spent on the security service said they feared the intelligence community would grow like a "mushroom". Social Democrat Jaap Burger spoke of "a network of control over the entire Dutch population". Activists and students who argued in the 60s that the security service should be abolished described it as an "anachronism", an obsolete remnant of the past and a perpetual engine.

Insights

Since last year the Netherlands has had a new law governing its two secret services, the AIVD and the MIVD. The new law on intelligence and security services (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten or Wiv) has been and still is strongly criticized, above all because it allows non-targeted access to telephone and internet traffic via cable. Under the previous law, which dates back to 2002, intelligence services have been authorized to conduct mass interception of wireless transmissions, such as satellite and radio communications, of course, traditional targeted telephones and targeted internet sockets.
The ban on interception of bulk cables is not the only thing that makes the Dutch intelligence services different from those of many other countries. Probably the biggest difference is the fact that WIV applies to both foreign and domestic operations, as if the two secret services were responsible for both internal security and foreign intelligence.
The General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, or AIVD) covers civilian domain and focuses on jihadist terrorism, radicalization, right and left extremism, counter-espionage and cyber threats. This is mostly domestic, but the AIVD also has a small branch that collects foreign information from and on a select range of countries. The Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, or MIVD) covers military matters and is therefore more foreign-oriented than its civilian counterpart. The MIVD is responsible for the security of the Dutch armed forces and for gathering information on foreign intelligence in military matters, while at the same time providing support to Dutch military missions abroad, such as in Mali. When it comes to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), AIVD and MIVD have combined their efforts into a joint unit called the Joint SIGINT Cyber ​​Unit (JSCU), which became operational in 2014. The JSCU is responsible for most of the interception capabilities technique, from traditional telephone tapping to IT operations. The JSCU is not authorized to conduct offensive cyber operations. The latter are led by the Defense Cyber ​​Command (DCC) of the Dutch armed forces.
Since its predecessor, the Nationale Sigint Organisatie (NSO), the JSCU has occupied two large listening posts: a satellite interception station near Burum, in the northern province of Friesland, and a relatively large radio interceptor near Eibergen, just beyond the German border in the east of the country. These locations are used for mass interception of wireless communications, primarily for military purposes, since most (but not all) civilian communications have switched to fiber optic cables.

For the new power of non-targeted interception of cable traffic, four new access points will be established over the next four years. The big question is, of course, where these hotspots will be: Citizens fear there will be a hit in the big Amsterdam AMS-IX exchange so that Dutch services will be able to 'read everyone's mail'.

"Intelligence vacuum cleaner": this is how its security service is defined by the Dutch