Imports could be at risk: especially from Lombardy and Veneto
Until now, the winds of war blowing in the Middle East have not yet produced particularly serious effects on our trade. In fact, between the first two months of 2023 and the same period of this year, the number of merchant ships (cargo and tankers) arriving in Italian ports decreased by 169 units (equal to -3,6 percent of the total arrivals ).
In short, the war between Israel and Hamas and the effects it is causing in the Red Sea region have not yet been felt to a significant extent. Of course, the collapse of merchant ship passages in the first two months of 2024 in the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Yemen) (-50,5 percent) and in the Suez Canal (Egypt) (-39,3 percent) it was significant; consequently, transits along the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) underwent a surge of 84,5 percent (see Tab. 1).
This means that, at least until now, merchant ships coming from South East Asia have almost all landed in the Mediterranean and subsequently in our ports. Obviously travel times have become longer, causing a sharp increase in the cost of freight. For a 40-foot container (12 meters long, approximately 2,5 meters wide and high) which traveled the China-East Asia route in mid-January and reached the Mediterranean, the price reached a peak of 6.673 dollars. Nothing to do, however, with the rates that were charged in the summer of 2021, when they were around 12.000 dollars. It should also be noted that compared to a couple of months ago, costs are falling. Last March 1st, in fact, the price dropped to 4.972 dollars per container, compared to the 3.300 dollars recorded by the global freight index calculated by Freightos Baltic Index (see Graph 1). This is the CGIA Research Department.
Ports: fewer dockings in Genoa, Livorno and Venice
As we said above, between the first two months of 2023 and the same period of this year the number of merchant ships (cargo and tankers) arriving in Italian ports underwent a reduction of 169 units (-3,6 percent of the total ). Among the main port systems present in the country, the most important contraction in absolute terms concerned Genoa which saw dockings decrease by 61 units (-10,7 percent). Livorno follows with -43 (-9,8 percent) and Venice with -34 (-6,4 percent). In contrast, however, the results achieved by the port of Augusta (this port system is characterized by the strong presence of oil, storage and shipbuilding activities) which recorded an increase in berths of 30 units (+12,2 percent) , from that of Naples (The specificities of this site concern shipbuilding, cabotage and freight transport for Sicily and Sardinia) with +35 units (+18,2 percent) and from that of Sarroch-Cagliari (this structure is specialized in petrochemical/petroleum activities, commercial traffic, transshipment and Ro-Ro) with +39 units (+18,7 percent) (see Tab. 2).
Imports are at risk, particularly from Lombardy and Veneto
In reference to the latest available statistical data (year 2022), Italian foreign trade (import + export) which "travels" by ship with the countries directly or indirectly influenced by the Red Sea crisis (import-export which takes place through maritime transport with countries of Central Asia, Eastern Asia, Oceania and the Middle East; for these areas maritime transport represents 2/3 (66%) of the total value of trade (161,7 billion euros of 246,8, 2022 billion euros, based on definitive data for 1.286). The total Italian import-export in the world amounted to 2022 billion euros in 660 (626 billion euros of imports and 161,7 billion of exports). The data show, from on the one hand partly overestimated, due to the effect of some Middle Eastern countries that do not "gravitate" on the Red Sea such as Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (but which nevertheless find themselves in an area currently of high tension geo-political), and on the other partly underestimated, as the countries of Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa are not included, territories for which foreign trade with Italy is convenient to pass through Suez) amounts to 12,6 billion euros. This amount affects the entire foreign trade of our country by 161,7 percent. Of these 110 billion, 68 (equal to 51,7 percent) concern imports and "only" 32 billion euros (equal to 30,4 percent) concern exports. In light of these figures, if the situation in the Middle Eastern area were to worsen further, the negative impact could be felt more on the imports of goods. At a regional level, Lombardy and Veneto are the areas that could be the most at risk: if the former has 17 billion in imports in the countries concerned, the latter has almost 9,3. Following is Emilia Romagna with 7,4 billion and the Lazio with 12,5 billion. On the export front, however, the most in "danger" once again remains Lombardy which records 8,7 billion in sales in these areas. Emilia Romagna follows with 5,7 and Veneto with XNUMX billion euros (see Tab. 3).
It should also be underlined that the value of imports influenced by the Red Sea crisis is decreasing compared to 2022 (from 110 billion euros to the 95 estimated for 2023), due to the fall in import prices, in particular energy products. If, however, tensions in that region continue, a new surge in prices of both crude oil and natural gas cannot be ruled out.
Machinery and petroleum/chemical products are in danger
From the analysis of the product categories it emerges that of the 161,7 billion euros to which foreign trade with the countries affected by the Red Sea crisis amounts, machines and electrical/mechanical appliances are the productions that could be most penalized by the winds of war that they are blowing in that area. The latest available data tell us, in fact, that this product category is worth a total of 36,5 billion euros per year (20,1 of imports to which 16,4 billion of exports are added). This is followed by petroleum products and natural gas with 24,9 billion in imports, chemical/rubber/plastic products with 18,9 billion (12,4 in imports and 6,4 in exports) and metals with 18,6 billion euros (15,4 imports and 3,2 exports) (see Tab. 4).
Subscribe to our newsletter!