Emadeddin Muntasser, an analyst and founding member of the Libyan American Public Affairs Council, and Mohamed Fouad, political analyst and TV journalist, wrote a very interesting editorial in "Libyan Observer", about Plan "B" that the UN would be carrying out in Libya to try to bring the contenders to a negotiating table to gradually arrive at safe elections.
Libya is in a worse crisis than after the 2011 revolution. In a country very rich in oil and gas, basic services are often interrupted by the armed gangs that control the capital in the west. In the east, Khalifa Haftar finds himself stuck in a difficult truce with various militias. Meanwhile, southern Libya is overrun by the migration of Touareg and Toubou and by African mercenaries. Libya is not a failed state, but three failed states with dozens of militias fighting for control of the territory and then sitting at the peace table.
The new Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations in Libya Stephanie Williams presented a new plan for the country. Following the failures of the "Action Plan" put forward by the United Nations envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame, there is a possibility that the "Plan B" proposed by Williams could be successful since it also has the support of Salame himself .
The lack of functioning government institutions, security forces and a justice system has led to corruption and violence at all levels. The House of Representatives (HoR) refuses to fulfill its obligations under the Libyan Political Agreement, including the failure to ratify the Government of National Accord (GNA), the elimination of parallel institutions, the approval of the electoral law or the facilitation of a referendum on the constitution.
International politics has also played a role in increasing violence and corruption. French and Italian interests continue to compete in Libya. While the UAE, Egypt, along with other actors in Libya, try to carry out their own programs.
Haftar would then have appealed directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin for help.
In addition to these obstacles, some major armed groups moved to the Libyan capital last week with the stated aim of ridding the capital of armed gangs and restoring law and order. Tripoli is in a continuous state of emergency with ongoing urban battles between militias and armed groups loyal to the GNA, despite the fragile UN ceasefire signed on Tuesday, September 5, 2018.
Plan B
It is in these circumstances that Williams advances his plan by convening a National Congress in Libya. First, this congress appeals to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to withdraw recognition from all political institutions that derive their legitimacy from UN Resolution 2259. Then Congress will "advise" the UN that presidential elections at this time of discord and insecurity would further divide the country so that no "side will win." Third, Congress will ask the UN Security Council for a resolution under Chapter 7 to compel all parties in Libya to organize general parliamentary elections within six months based on existing electoral laws. Finally, the plan requires that the United States and its allies must ensure compliance with the UN resolution.
The final preparations for Plan B will take place during a scheduled conference in Italy to be held in November. Discussions are underway to determine who will attend the conference. Some of the organizers want to limit the influence of current players in the field, including GNA, HoR and Haftar, and encourage the participation of municipal leaders, tribal members and activists. Williams would instead be trying to bring together all the actors in the conflict - which include pro-Gaddafi and pro-Haftar groups - so that everyone can get a seat at the table.
Williams is therefore working on two other fronts. Encourage activists and jurists to legally challenge any law passed by the HoR that may not be conducive to holding elections or which could lead to further instability. It is also trying to tame the armed gangs in Tripoli and elsewhere. Libya Observer reported that Moroccan intelligence agents, backed by the CIA, are trying to "mitigate" some militia leaders.
The obstacles
While Williams is looking to tackle multiple fronts simultaneously to ensure the success of his plan, he needs to be wary of potential pitfalls that could derail his ambitions.
The most obvious trap is to include armed bands of Tripoli as part of the peace process. The success, power and profits of these armed groups depend exclusively on the lack of public order. In order to avoid losing these privileges or even being prosecuted, the militia leaders could subvert any plan to revive the Libyan state, in a legality context.
The current electoral law needs to be revised to ensure that cities or regions are not discriminated against. Plan B also overlooks one of Libya's most important issues today: the lack of a constitution. It should offer Libyans a roadmap to a constitution by forming a committee of international experts with a clear mandate: to review the 1963 constitution and put it to a vote next year.
Also organizing national elections, with international support and US pressure, could be a failure. The process must proceed gradually, holding incremental elections in regions that are under civilian control and deemed safe enough. A fully functioning and sovereign parliament will need to be formed with members meeting to hold regular voting sessions. The new parliament must have full sovereignty and legislative powers, including the authority to form a government regardless of the number of members who have been voted on. Other members of parliament will join when they are elected in regular and safe districts. Furthermore, competing international programs must be stopped. French interference with the goal of a government friendly to Paris and Abu Dhabi can be countered with American pressure. Pursuing the financial resources of corrupt politicians, militia leaders and smugglers must become a top priority for the international community. For those seeking to destabilize renewed efforts in Libya, especially Egypt and the UAE, the threat of economic sanctions could be a solution. Any entity or country that violates the arms embargo in Libya faces the consequences. Finally, the threat of an armed religious group, the Madkhalis, should not be underestimated. They have a violent and undemocratic ideology which has its spiritual basis within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It will therefore be necessary to encourage some armed groups in western Libya to counter the Madkhalis in order to bring plan B to success. A prosperous and free Libya will not only deprive the Islamic State and other extremist groups of a North African base, it will also offer Europe a surety on oil and gas supplies as an alternative to the Russian pipeline and a slowdown in immigration from sub- Africa. Saharan. However, the UN Plan B in Libya is not in line with the ideals of the Libyan revolution as it would bring to power Gaddafi's supporters and a warlord "Haftar" under investigation by the ICC for multiple war crimes.
Plan B would offer Libya a form of liquid democracy that would bring stability, but not necessarily freedom. Unless the pro-democracy forces in Libya are able to provide a viable alternative.