(by Massimiliano D'Elia) Since the US primacy in the world, as a global police force, is fading or is no longer what it once was, the international order is today more than ever in chaos. World leaders are increasingly tempted to challenge the limits of international law to strengthen their own influence and diminish that of rivals.
Multilateralism and its constraints are under siege, challenged by a more transactional policy. The instruments of collective action, such as the UN Security Council, are paralyzed while those of collective responsibility, including the International Criminal Court, are ignored and often denigrated.
Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran in the 80s, the 1990 war in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, the post 11/2009 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Sri Lanka's brutal XNUMX campaign against Tamils and the the collapse of Libya and South Sudan are the effects of a reasonably consistent period of US and Western domination.
A liberal and nominally rule-based order did not prevent rulers from bringing down nations or dictatorships when they saw fit. Today the world order and Western influence are significantly undermined by the rise of Moscow, Beijing and the developing countries.
US alliances had shaped international affairs for years, established regional boundaries and orders in a structured way. Now, as the influence of the West wanes, accelerated by US President Donald Trump's contempt for traditional allies and Europe's struggles with Brexit and nativism, leaders around the world are probing and pushing beyond their own ambitions. to test how far they can go.
In their internal politics, many of these new leaders cultivate and weave an explosive mixture of nationalism and authoritarianism. The mix varies from place to place, but generally involves the rejection of international institutions and rules. Once upon a time international solidarity existed, today everything has changed for the growth of domestic populism which celebrates greater social and political identity, defames minorities, migrants and tends to attack the rule of law and independence of the press, elevating national sovereignty above everything.
Examples are the mass expulsion of 700.000 Rohingya by Myanmar, the Syrian regime's brutal repression of the popular uprising, the Cameroonian government's apparent determination to stifle the Anglophone insurrection, the Venezuelan government's economic warfare against his own people and the silence of dissent in Turkey.
Even across borders, these leaders tend to test the norms by annexing parts of Georgia and Crimea and fueling separatist violence in Ukraine's Donbass region. Russia, for example, is imposing its weight on the Sea of Azov, poisoning Western societies through cyber warfare.
China hinders freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and arbitrarily detains Canadian citizens, including Michael Kovrig of the International Crisis Group. Saudi Arabia is at the forefront of the war in Yemen and a protagonist in the kidnapping of a Lebanese prime minister and the grisly murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Iran plots attacks on dissidents on European soil. Israel is increasingly systematically undermining the foundations for a possible two-state solution.
All these extraterritorial actions start from the assumption that there will be little consequence for violations of international norms.
The whole thing is generated in large part by Trump's calmness in respecting human rights. Similarly, Trump is moving towards American international commitments such as "tearing up" the Iran nuclear deal and, worse, threatening to impose economic sanctions on those who choose to abide by it, hinting that he will leave the Nuclear Forces Treaty at an intermediate interval. if the US demands are not met.
The greatest danger is that world leaders are now convinced of their immunity.
Fortunately, international pressure still works in a few cases. Bangladesh seemed ready to forcibly repatriate some Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, but it has stopped, almost certainly in response to international pressure. The feared Russian reconquest of Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria, has, for now, been averted, largely due to Turkish, European and US objections. A potential Saudi-led offensive on the Yemeni port of Hodeidah has also been averted for now, with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi largely discouraged by warnings about the humanitarian impact and costs for their international position.
Elsewhere, leaders anticipating impunity have been taken aback by the gravity of the response: Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, by the stiff sanctions and demonstration of united resolve that Western powers have maintained since the Crimean annexation of Moscow. and the killing of his former agent on British soil. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the outrage that followed Khashoggi's murder.
Overall, however, it is difficult to escape the feeling that these are exceptions that demonstrate the absence of rules. The international order, as we know it, is crumbling and for 2019 PRP Channel reports the following 10 hot areas to keep under observation.
Yemen
The humanitarian crisis, the worst in the world, could worsen further in 2019 if key players fail to seize the opportunity created in recent weeks by United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in reaching a partial ceasefire.
After more than four years of war and a Saudi-led siege, nearly 16 million Yemenis face "severe food insecurity", according to the UK. This means that one in two Yemenis does not have enough to eat.
The fighting began in late 2014 after Houthi rebels expelled the internationally recognized government from the capital. It escalated the following March, when Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, began bombing and blocking Yemen, with the aim of reversing the Houthis' gains and reinstalling the ousted government. Western powers have largely supported the Saudi-led campaign.
In late 2018, UAE-backed Yemeni militias surrounded Hodeidah, a Houthi-controlled port through which aid for millions of starving Yemenis passed. The coalition seemed intent on relocating, convinced that taking port would crush the rebellion and make the Houthis more flexible. Mark Lowcock, the leading US relief officer, warned that such action could result in a "great famine." Khashoggi's murder prompted Western powers to thwart the ambitions of the Gulf coalition. On November 9, the United States announced that it would no longer refuel coalition fighters to conduct air strikes in Yemen. A month later, Griffiths, with the help of Washington, concluded the "Stockholm Agreement" between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, including a fragile ceasefire around Hodeidah.
There are other glimmers of light. US pressure to end the conflict could intensify in the 2019. The Senate has already voted to consider legislation that excludes any US involvement in the war. Once the Democrats take control of the House of Representatives in January 2019, they could move more convincingly in this direction.
Afghanistan.
If Yemen is the worst humanitarian disaster in the world, Afghanistan suffers its deadliest fighting. In 2018, the war killed more than 40.000 fighters and civilians. Trump's decision in mid-December to reduce US forces in Afghanistan is Washington's signal to advance diplomatic efforts to end the war. In 2018, the war took a higher toll than at any time since the Taliban were expelled from Kabul more than 17 years ago. A three-day truce in June, implemented by the Taliban and the government offered a brief respite, although the fighting resumed soon after. The Taliban fighters now control half of the country, cutting transport routes and besieging cities and towns.
In September, Washington appointed veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as an envoy for peace talks. Taliban leaders appear to be taking the talks seriously, although the process is blocked by the continued insistence of the United States for a full disengagement of international forces as a precondition for a broader peace process involving other Afghan factions.
Just a few days after Khalilzad's last talks with the Taliban, Trump's bomb arrived. Withdraw 7.000 troops. All sides are convinced, however, that a rapid withdrawal could provoke a major new civil war, an outcome that no one, including the Taliban, wants.
Neighboring countries and other countries involved in Afghanistan - particularly Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China do not want a hasty withdrawal of the Americans. They may be more inclined to support US diplomacy should Washington abandon its strategic influence in South Asia. Trump's announcement could therefore spur them to contribute to the end of the war, but regional powers could just as easily increase their meddling.
The timing of Trumo's announcement stunned everyone, Khalilzad, US military leaders and the Afghan government itself. The fact that the withdrawal was not coordinated with Khalilzad weakened the diplomat in the ongoing negotiations with the Taliban. In Kabul, the sense of betrayal is palpable. A few days later, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, in response, appointed two anti-Taliban officials known for their hard lines as his defense and interior ministers. Trump's decision therefore only added uncertainty. Decision that resulted in the resignation of US defense secretary Mattis.
China and USA
The rhetoric between the two leaders is increasingly belligerent and the rivalry could have more serious geopolitical consequences than all the other crises listed this year.
In a deeply divided Washington, on one position they all agree, namely that China is an opponent with whom the United States is inexorably stuck in strategic competition.
Most US policymakers agree that Beijing has used institutions and rules to join the World Trade Organization or join the UK Convention on the Law of the Sea. The lifetime presidency of President Xi Jinping, the rapid expansion of the Chinese military and the extension of the Communist Party's control across the state and society confirm the dangerous turn in the country of the dragon in Washington. The United States Government's National Defense Strategy of 2018 cites "interstate strategic competition" as its primary concern, with China and Russia named as primary competitors, after many years of terrorism at the fore.
China has no desire to radically challenge the world order at the moment. Nor will it be able to match Washington's global weight at any time, provided the Trump administration takes steps to stop the bleeding of allies. However, Beijing is increasingly ready to throw its weight into multilateral institutions and its region. In Asia, there is already a Chinese sphere of influence where neighbors are still sovereign but deferential.
Risks of direct conflict remain slim, but the South China Sea is a worrying sticking point. The past two decades have seen occasional episodes of conflict between Chinese forces and US planes. Beijing claims 90% of the South China Sea, stopping just a few miles from the Vietnamese, Malay and Philippine coasts and aggressively building strategic bases on natural and man-made islands. From Beijing's point of view, such maneuvers are standard operating procedures for what Xi calls a "big country". China wants what the US has: fragile neighbors, influence around its periphery, and the ability to control its maritime approaches and transportation lines.
Beijing and Washington could reach some form of trade agreement in the coming months, which would help ease tensions. But any respite is probably short-lived because the competition also extends to other attractive continents such as Africa.
Saudi Arabia, United States, Israel and Iran
Just like 2018, 2019 also presents risks of confrontation - deliberate or involuntary - involving the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran. The first three share a common view of the Tehran government as a threat that has been encouraged for too long and whose regional aspirations need to be curbed. For Washington, this has translated into a withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, the reintroduction of sanctions, more aggressive rhetoric and threats of powerful retaliation in the event of Iranian provocation.
Riyadh has embraced this new tone and, especially in the voice of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has suggested that it will fight and try to counter Iran in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and even on Iranian soil.
Israel has focused on Syria, where it has routinely hit Iranian and Iran-aligned targets, but has also threatened to strike at the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran, meanwhile, has resumed missile testing, and the United States has accused it of using its Shiite followers in Iraq to threaten the US presence there. The risk of an accidental confrontation in Yemen, the Persian Gulf, Syria or Iraq cannot be averted.
The main source of tensions so far has been the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of secondary sanctions on countries engaged in business with Tehran. That Iran did not respond naturally to what it describes as an economic war owes much to the efforts of the other signatories to the agreement, namely European countries, Russia and China. Their attempts to preserve a modicum of space for trade coupled with their continued diplomatic engagement with Tehran provided sufficient reason for Iranian leaders to adhere to the terms of the agreement.
This very vague calculation could change. The United States and Saudi Arabia hope that the sanctions will force Iran to change its behavior or favor regime change as the economic squeeze is affecting the Iranian people.
Hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran is developing throughout the Middle East, from Yemen to Lebanon. Any of these conflicts could escalate. Yemen is probably the most dangerous. If a Houthi missile were to inflict casualties in a Saudi city or if the Houthis aimed at international trade expeditions in the Red Sea - a move they have long threatened to make - the conflict could enter a much more dangerous phase.
In Syria, Israel has so far been adept at hitting Iranian targets without sparking a wider war. Iran, no doubt aware of the potential cost of such an escalation, reckons it can absorb such attacks without endangering its deepest interests and long-term presence in Syria. But the Syrian theater is congested, Iranian tolerance is not unlimited, and the likelihood of a miscalculation or an attack gone wrong remains a risk.
The October assassination of Khashoggi amplified criticism in the United States of both Saudi foreign policy and Washington's unconditional support. These sentiments will intensify next year as Democrats take control of the House. One can only hope that this will lead to stronger US pressure on Riyadh to end the war in Yemen and greater Congressional scrutiny over US and Saudi Arabian escalation policies.
Syria
At the end of 2018, the Syrian conflict appeared to continue on the same path. It seemed that the Bashar al-Assad regime, with the help of Iran and Russia, would win its battle against the opposition. The war against the Islamic State had come to an end. Foreign actors maintained a fragile balance in various parts of the country: between Israel, Iran and Russia in the southwest; Russia and Turkey in the northwest; and the United States and Turkey in the northeast. But with a phone call in mid-December to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announcing the withdrawal of American troops, Trump reversed that balance; increased the odds of a bloody conflict involving Turkey, its Syrian allies, the Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime; by doing so, it has potentially given the Islamic State a new lease on life by fueling the chaos it thrives on.
The Trump administration's previous policy of indefinitely maintaining a military presence in Syria was always of questionable value. It was not clear how 2.000 US troops could curb Iranian influence or create significant pressure on the Assad regime. The fight against the Islamic State is not over and it is not considered necessary to keep American troops on the ground. That said, a hasty withdrawal poses a major risk: it will leave the People's Protection Units (YPG) - the Kurdish-dominated armed group that collaborated with US forces against the Islamic State and now controls about a third of Syrian territory - dangerously exposed.
The YPG could come across an attack from Turkey (which it considers a terrorist organization due to its affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK) or from the Assad regime (which aims to reassert control over the whole country, including the north-east rich in oil). If such disorder occurs, the Islamic State could seize the opportunity to reorganize and regain some of the territory it has lost in the past two years.
Both the United States and Russia are interested in preventing a total fight for the Syrian territory because of the danger of the Islamic State and because (from Russia's point of view) it could lead Turkey to control a greater number of territories allied in Moscow.
Washington and Moscow will have to persuade Turkey not to launch an assault on the territory controlled by the YPG militias, persuade the YPG to reduce its armed profile and facilitate an agreement between Damascus and the YPG involving the return of the Syrian government to the north-east united with some degree of Kurdish self-government in the area. Such an outcome would allow Syria to restore its sovereignty, reassuring Turkey by limiting the authority and firepower of the YPG and protecting the Kurds from military attacks.
Nigeria
The Nigerians will go to the polls in February 2019 to elect a president and a new federal legislature, and again in March to choose state governors and legislators. The Nigerian elections are traditionally violent and the conditions this time are particularly flammable.
The fight between current president Muhammadu Buhari and his main rival, former vice president Atiku Abubakar, will be very bloody. Relations between the Buhari government and the Progressive Congress and the Abubakar People's Democratic Party - which ruled for 16 years until Buhari came to power - are as harsh in the capital as they are across the country. Disputes between Buhari and the leaders of the two houses of parliament delayed funding for the election commission and security agencies, hindering election preparations. The opposition's distrust of both the commission and the security forces increases the risk of protests during and after the vote. Such protests have a troubled precedent: demonstrations following the 2011 polls turned into attacks on minorities in northern Nigeria, in which over 800 people died.
The election comes on top of the other challenges. Levels of violent crime and general insecurity remain high across much of the country. Civilians in parts of the northeast bear the brunt of the brutal conflict between government troops and Islamist insurgent Boko Haram. A militant faction, known as the Province of the Islamic State of West Africa, appears to be gaining ground. Violence in Nigeria's middle belt last year between predominantly Muslim shepherds and mostly Christian farmers reached unprecedented levels, leading to the killing of around 1.500 people. Although the bloodshed has calmed down in recent months, it has weakened intercommunal relations, particularly between Muslims and Christians, in those areas, which are notoriously important given that votes from there could sway the national presidential vote.
Already, politicians are fueling divisions for electoral purposes, including using inflammatory identity-based language against rivals. Even in the oil-rich Niger Delta, tensions between locals and the federal government could boil over this year, given anger at the latter's failure to deliver on promises to clean up oil pollution, build infrastructure and increase social investments in recent years.
The immediate priority for the government must be to avoid an electoral crisis by strengthening security in vulnerable states and take steps to ensure that security forces act impartially, while all parties are committed to conducting peaceful campaigns and handling disputes. in a lawful way.
South Sudan
Since the South Sudanese civil war broke out five years ago, 400.000 people have died. In September, President Salva Kiir and his main rival, the former vice president, signed an agreement for a ceasefire and to govern together until the 2022 elections.
The agreement satisfies - at least for now - the interests of the two antagonists and those of Presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, the two regional leaders with the most influence in South Sudan. Above all, it reduced the violence. For now, this is reason enough to support the deal.
Predicting elections in 2022, the deal perpetuates the rivalry between Kiir and Machar until then, paving the way for another showdown. The most alarming and security agreements for Juba, the capital, remain contested, as well as plans to unify a national army.
In Sudan, meanwhile, Bashir faces what could be a serious challenge to his own rule. In mid-December, protesters took to the streets in many cities due to high prices, urging the president to step down.
Finally, donors, wary of funding transactions that have failed in the past, await more stability. The United States, which until recently led Western diplomacy in South Sudan, took a step back. Others are waiting to see the tangible steps of Kiir and Machar before opening their checkbooks.
This caution is understandable. But if this agreement fails, it is not clear what will replace it, and the country could collapse back into chaos with large bloodshed.
Cameroon
A crisis in the Anglophone areas of Cameroon is on the verge of escalating civil war and destabilizing a country that was once considered a happy island in a troubled region.
The pace of the crisis has steadily increased since 2016, when Anglophone teachers and lawyers took to the streets to protest the creeping use of French in education and legal systems. Their demonstrations have morphed into broader protests about the marginalization of Cameroon's Anglophone minority, which represents about one fifth of the country's population. The government refused to acknowledge the grievances of the English speakers and the security forces violently repressed the protests by arresting the activists. The response further fueled anglophone anger at the central government.
Nearly 10 separatist militias now fight government forces, while two organizations provide guidance from abroad: the interim government of Ambazonia (the alleged name of the self-proclaimed Anglophone state) and the Governing Council of Ambazonia. The separatists are called not only against the Cameroonian security forces, but also against the pro-government "self-defense" groups. Criminal gangs in English-speaking areas have taken advantage of the chaos to expand their businesses.
According to estimates by the International Crisis Group, the fighting has already killed around 200 soldiers, gendarmes and police officers, with around 300 injured, and killed more than 600 separatists. At least 500 civilians died. The UN counts 30.000 Anglophone refugees in Nigeria and 437.000 internally displaced persons in Cameroon.
Defusing the crisis will require measures to strengthen confidence. These should include the release by the government of all political prisoners, including separatist leaders; a commitment on both sides to implement a ceasefire and support for a planned English-speaking conference, which would allow English speakers to select leaders to represent them in negotiations. These steps could pave the way for talks between the government and the English-speaking leaders, followed by some form of national dialogue in which options for decentralization or federalism would be on the table.
Cameroonian authorities made a welcome move in mid-December when they released 289 Anglophone detainees, although hundreds, including separatist leaders, are still behind bars. It is unclear whether this demonstrates genuine change on the part of the government, which appeared determined to crush the rebels rather than address the Anglophone concerns. Without a meaningful and mutual compromise, Cameroon risks sliding into an important and destabilizing conflict.
Ukraine
The war in Ukraine continues to burn. The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and subsequent support for separatists in Ukraine's eastern Donbass region is frightening to the world. The latest flashpoint is the Sea of Azov, where Russian and Ukrainian ships collided in November and Russia effectively blocked access to the Kerch Strait at the mouth of the sea.
As Kiev sees it, the attack on Ukrainian military ships and the kidnapping of two dozen sailors is the culmination of months of Russian attempts to drive Ukrainian shipping out of those waters, violating a 2003 bilateral treaty that guarantees free navigation for both. the countries. Moscow claims ships were entering its coastal waters and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko provoked a skirmish to bolster Western support and its national base ahead of presidential elections scheduled for March 2019. Poroshenko's subsequent efforts to introduce martial law didn't help; the Kremlin, along with the president's internal critics, portrayed it as a political stunt. Either way, the incident clearly highlighted Moscow's newfound willingness to openly use force against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, fighting in the Donbass continues and civilians living on the front lines, abandoned by both Kiev and separatists, are paying the price. Neither Ukraine nor Russia have taken steps to end the war. Kiev refuses to transfer power to the Donbass - something it has pledged to do as part of the Minsk agreements that set a path to ending the war - until Russia withdraws weapons and personnel from areas separated from the separatists, which that Moscow shows little willingness to do. Proposals for possible peacekeeping missions have not yet found easy implementation.
Kiev is likely not to move before the elections (apart from the presidential vote, parliamentary polls are expected before the end of the year). Russia can loosen its grip in separatist areas, but it is unlikely to stop influencing the Donbass anytime soon. Ukrainian elections or internal developments in Russia could offer opportunities for the peace process. But as Azov shows, the danger of escalation is always present.
Venezuela
Home to huge oil reserves, Venezuela should be the envy of its neighbors, yet the country's implosion threatens to provoke a regional crisis.
The Venezuelan economy is in free fall, with a devastating social impact. Poverty and malnutrition are rampant. Diseases once eradicated, such as diphtheria, have returned. About 3 million of the 31 million Venezuelans have fled the country, mainly to Colombia and other neighboring countries. The UN expects the number to rise to 5,3 million by the end of 2019.
The ruling clique of President Nicolás Maduro, which has mismanaged the economy, now refuses to admit Venezuelan agony and does not accept humanitarian aid. The government has dismantled the country's institutions, stripping the parliament and controlling the opposition. On January 10, 2019, Maduro will begin a second term, although his internal opponents and much of the outside world consider his re-election credible. The opposition is, however, paralyzed by internal strife, with a faction, mostly in exile, calling on foreign powers to overthrow Maduro by force.
Venezuela's neighbors are facing the problem of the influx of people fleeing the country. A barometer of Latin American impatience is the position of Luis Almagro, the general secretary of the Organization of American States. Last September he said that the region "should not exclude any option", even the military one. The Trump administration has also made similar hints. Such a speech could be just that and one of Maduro's strongest critics, the new Colombian president Iván Duque, disavowed it in October as external military action could wreak further chaos.