The head of Germany's domestic intelligence office warned of the security risks posed by Chinese direct investments in German high-tech companies and other European companies. Since 2012, Hans-Georg Maassen has been director of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, National Security and the Counterintelligence Agency of Germany. Speaking to reporters, Maassen said his agency noted an inverse correlation between cyber espionage attacks on Germany by Chinese actors and the takeover of German tech companies by Chinese companies. German counterintelligence officials were puzzled, he said, about a drastic reduction in Chinese cyber espionage activities in 2016. But they eventually realized that cyber espionage operations were being replaced by "legal methods," he said, such as the direct acquisitions of German hi-tech companies by Chinese companies.
The purpose of these acquisitions was "to gain access to German technological know-how," Maassen added. He went on to say that "industrial cyberpionage is no longer necessary if an actor can simply exploit liberal economic regulations to buy companies, and then proceed to cannibalize them, to access their know-how". Maassen noted that Germany has raised no objections to foreign investment and the free flow of capital from all countries, including China. However, he added, "some direct investments in specific technologies can compromise internal security". Maassen cited several examples in his presentation, including the acquisition of Kuka, a German robotics company, by a Chinese investor in 2016. He said that in recent months, Chinese companies have attempted to buy holdings in 50 Hertz, a German energy grid, a German car manufacturer such as Daimler and Cotesa, a German aerospace contractor.
In response to a question from a reporter about policy coordination between Germany and the European Union, Maassen said Germany, France and Italy have lobbied Brussels to update and modernize screening procedures against foreign acquisitions of companies involved. in the production and sale of "sensitive technologies". It noted that a new EU-wide screening mechanism should be established by the end of 2018.