(Prof. Barbara Faccenda) Israel and Egypt share an interest in defeating the Egyptian affiliate of the Islamic State (IS). When and if the Egyptian branch of IS - Sinai Province - is defeated, what happens next, in the restless Sinai Peninsula, remains unclear and the interests of these convenient allies will presumably begin to diverge.
The threat to the security of Egypt and Israel by Egyptian jihadist militants in Northern Sinai began in 2011, well before they declared an alliance to IS in November 2014.
Before joining the IS, one of the jihadists' goals was to create a rift in relations between the two neighboring countries: the attacks on gas pipelines produced a rift in the Israeli-Egyptian economic relationship and the cross-border assault in southern Israel pushed relations diplomats at a breaking point.
Later, in 2013, the jihadists target a number of military targets and the following year, with the affiliation to the IS and the increase in their military capabilities, they manifest themselves as a threat not only to Israel, but more generally for the international community.
In 2015 the Sinai - IS Province carries out a further series of attacks: it besieges the city of North Sinai Sheikh Zuweid, targeting international peacekeepers; it hits an Egyptian ship in the Mediterranean with an anti-tank missile and shoots down, with an explosive device hidden in a soda can, an airplane full of Russian tourists over the Sinai.
In all likelihood, it was these events that led Israel to the decision to increase its involvement in the Egyptian counter-terrorism campaign. Exclusively from the point of view of counter-terrorism, cooperation between the two countries turns out to be sensible, nevertheless it is good to keep in mind that although Israel has among its priorities that the Egyptian government and its institutions remain stable, it nourishes the firm interest so that Sinai is not used as a place for launching attacks against its own territory.
Targeting jihadist infrastructure in Sinai, similar to Israeli attacks in Syria in recent years, would risk shaking Egypt's already fragile stability.
Nonetheless, Israel retains a priority not shared with Egypt: a strategic margin in case of military surprises.
More than 40 years after the Camp David accords, the relations between the two former enemies cannot be considered friendly or trustworthy. The agreement and formal Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty that followed in 1979 establishes the Sinai Peninsula as a buffer zone between Egypt - west of the Suez Canal - and the border with Israel. The annexation to the Security Treaty limits the deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai. However, since 2011, Israel has granted Egypt permission to capture jihadist groups; “Accorded activities” which are permitted by the Treaty and are regularly monitored by the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) international peacekeeping force in Sinai which monitors and supervises the implementation of the agreement.
Israel has no interest in formally amending the peace treaty and has hindered changes to the MFO. When (and if) the jihadists are defeated, Israel expects the Egyptian military to once again unfold as a force structure in line with the limits of the Treaty.
Egypt, on the other hand, would prefer a military stay in Sinai. The Egyptian army has established bases and checkpoints throughout the Sinai Peninsula. It has re-developed airfields and added military infrastructure to the civilian airport in the North Sinai capital: el-Arish.
It should be noted that, in recent years, Egypt has built its military arsenal with French jets, Chinese armed drones and various Russian arms contracts. The Egyptian decision to sign a military agreement with the United States, which previous governments had opposed, known as the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, or CISMOA, which allows the transfer of "sensitive" American defense technology, suggests that Cairo is interested in acquiring more advanced American military equipment.