The clashes in Tripoli in recent days have involved militias close to the government of Abdul Hamid Ddeibah, recognized by the UN, and those close to Fathi Bashaga, premier recognized by parliament stationed in Tobruck, particularly close to Russia. The first ones prevailed, with Ddeibah also taking a selfie in the clash areas as a sign of strength. The future for the country is increasingly uncertain also because the openings for dialogue are fading more and more. A situation that does not benefit Italy as far as oil and oil are concerned control of migrator flowsi.
Copasir, in this regard, has raised the alarm on a precise Russian strategy: "Russia's engagement in Libya remains very intense - in fact, we read in a passage of the report - by virtue of the presence of the militias of the Wagner group in the Cyrenaica controlled by General Haftar ”.
Le Monde yesterday wrote about the powder keg in the Mare Nostrum: migrations in the Mediterranean are returning Italy to the status of the main "frontline" country, a status that Spain, under pressure from Morocco, had stolen from it in 2020.
From January to the first week of August, 44.000 migrants and refugees coming from the south bank of the
Mediterranean have landed on the peninsula, mainly on the island of Lampedusa which is now collapsing.
The curve of these arrivals shows a 40% increase compared to the corresponding period of 2021, according to data compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Italy thus absorbs almost 56% of the total flow of migrants crossing the Mediterranean for
reach Europe. In 2019, the percentage was only 9,2%. The decline that followed the migration crisis of 2015 is now behind us for Italians. The number of arrivals fell from 181.436 in 2016 to a minimum of 11.500 in 2019, before rising again in 2020 (36.435) and in 2021 (68.309).
The main cause of this resumption of crossings is to be found in the situation in Libya. Rome had managed to stem the flow of migrants thanks to agreements with the militias of Tripolitania (western Libya), which is the preferred platform for embarking towards Italy.
The Europeans, through the Irini military mission, had also released funds and delivered equipment to the Libyan coast guard to allow it to intercept these departures, at the cost of serious human rights violations.
The current instability in Libya has brought down the already fragile castle built so far. This is demonstrated by the resumption of arrivals in Italy from Tripolitania, which went from 13.139 in 2020 to 30.520 in 2021, that is, more than doubled.
The trend is still accelerating in the first six months of 2022, with the forecast of monthly landings of 3.442 people on the Italian coasts from Libya, compared to 2.543 in 2021.
New sea route
This migratory rebound is fueled by new migration channels such as those bringing refugees from Bangladesh. The latter are now the first nationality to land in Italy (17% of the total in the first seven months of 2022), like the Egyptians, supplanting the Tunisians (14%), who had represented the first national group in 2019 (24%) , 2020 (38%) and 2021 (24%).
Although the Bangladesh network is not exactly new, it has gained visibility due to the weakening of other channels due to the restrictive measures adopted by Europeans. For example, the pressure exerted on Niger to strengthen the surveillance of its Saharan border with Libya, which in the past was crossed in large numbers by Sub-Saharanians embarking on the adventurous crossing of the Mediterranean.
The "dam" seems to have held up, judging by the almost total disappearance of the Nigerian canal, which in 2016 represented the first nationality to land in Italy via Libya (21% of the total). However, this has not deterred the citizens of Bangladesh or even the Egyptians, who decide to use the eastern rather than the southern land routes to reach Libya.
The opening of a new sea route with origin in Turkey adds to this push towards Libya: 6.563 migrants and refugees used it from January 1 to August 31, more than doubling compared to the same period in 2021.
Afghans use them in large numbers, so much so that they become the fourth national group for arrivals in Italy (12% of the total). The country is therefore becoming the new target of migratory circuits that try to circumvent the difficulties of accessing Greece.
Although the number of arrivals on the Greek islands is increasing (3.000 in the first six months of 2022, or + 129% compared to the same period in 2021), it is still far from the peak of the migration crisis: 8.567.323 in 2015 or even 1.734.447. 2016 in XNUMX.
Landings in Greece today represent less than 15% of arrivals by sea in Europe, compared to 84% in 2015. The main reason: the 2016 agreement between Brussels and Ankara on the control of departures from the Turkish coasts, combined with the "pushbacks ”Offensive at sea by the Greek coast guard, who push back migrants to Turkey in violation of the Geneva Refugee Convention.
The emergence of Italy as the main European migratory "front line" in the Mediterranean has another cause: the easing of tensions around Spain.
These had reached a critical point in May 2021, with the incident of the mass entry of migrants into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta.
Interventions between Madrid and Rabat
It was the period in which Morocco "lifted its foot" on border control with Spain to punish the latter for its deemed hostile policy on the Western Sahara issue. As a result of this pressure exerted by Rabat through migrants, Spain had become the main area of migratory attrition in Mediterranean Europe, absorbing 42% of the flow of arrivals in the Old Continent, ahead of Italy (34,3%).
However, the normalization of relations between Madrid and Rabat, which took place on March 18 following the recognition by the head of the Spanish government Pedro Sanchez of Morocco's "autonomy" plan for Western Sahara - much to Algeria's chagrin - has upset the situation. The kingdom of Cherifa has once again become the vigilant guardian of its borders, to the point of having forcefully repressed, in June, the attempted forced entry of 1.500 sub-Saharan migrants and refugees into the enclave of Melilla, causing at least XNUMX deaths.
Since the reconciliation of March 18, the curves of arrivals in Spain have decreased, with a disturbing coincidence. The monthly average dropped to 2.047 from 3.599 for the whole of 2021, a decline of 43%. This sudden statistical inflection starting on March 18 is clearly linked to the diplomatic improvement between Madrid and Rabat.
Fears that Algeria will take revenge by "lifting its foot" on the departure of its harraga (irregular migrants) to the Spanish coast have not been confirmed, writes El Pais in the August 10 edition. The general trend is even that of a decrease in arrivals from Algeria, with the notable exception of the Balearic Islands, where landings are increasing.
The geopolitics of migration in the Mediterranean, where diplomatic cycles between capitals combine with the resilience of networks that bypass obstacles, is very fluid. The reappearance of a strong migration to Italy is proof of this.