US nuclear policy: the end of the tactical era
The deterrence of the United States is based on an arsenal capable of averting any use of nuclear power: it is the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction. It is not designed, theoretically, to be used in the prevention or during a conventional attack or in the presence of chemical and biological weapons in the field. Moscow, in its new military doctrine, envisages the use of nuclear warheads if defeat, in a conventional scenario, is certain. The Russian strategic doctrine also provides for the preventive use of nuclear power to compensate for the enemy's superior conventional forces. The de-escalation strategy would involve a large-scale US response in Second strike. Deterrence will always depend on a certain degree of indeterminacy and uncertainty. It is not so much what will be done in retaliation, but what will happen once the launches begin.
The use of nuclear power is provided in the United States Strategic Operation Command 8010. Updated in 2012, it should be declassified in 2022. Some steps, thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, have been made public.
In the section called Inquiry on the issue, it reads that "... with the end of the Cold War the international landscape has changed. Global security is characterized by protracted conflicts, constant change, enormous complexity and greater uncertainty. As dynamic concerns in space and cyberspace evolve, traditional threats to national security continue to be represented by sovereign states with emerging weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. "
The OPLAN 8010-12 targets an enemy X. It specifically mentions Russia and China, but "do not represent imminent danger for Americans." The OPLAN 8010-12 is a very simple text that gives a global view: it's the strategic reference text for several potential enemies who have nuclear arsenals or are trying to get them.
"The rapid technological evolution and the wide civilian availability of military capabilities have reduced entry costs by providing new weapons. Several actors have access to new features that in the past would not have achieved without significant investment. Overlapping sovereignty will continue to pose challenges for national security. "
In OPLAN 8010, the "need for an American political will to use strategic forces if deterrence falls" is noted. We have repeatedly analyzed the capabilities of the US nuclear triad, but the strategic plan made public does not mention it to a single passage:
"The goal is clear: use the appropriate system to eliminate the enemy's ability and its key decision-making mechanism to cease hostilities." The Principle of Deterrence is based on the balance of three scarce information and those covered by military secret. Sufficient information to scare the enemy.
The infallibility of the President of the United States gives him a clear discernment: transforming a conventional nuclear conflict. Tolerance thresholds are outlined, but in OPLAN 8010 it is plainly stated that "the president may order Stratcom to respond to a hostile act or an imminent threat".
There is no constraint on the potential use of nuclear power
"The use of any weapon, kinetic or non-kinetic, must comply with the fundamental principles of law in armed conflict on the basis of proportionality. Military necessity should avoid unnecessary suffering or risk of distinction. Principles that will have to be taken into account during the development and implementation of such plans. "
In addition to the different interpretations, the OPLAN 8010-12 does not clarify how a nuclear response can be proportional.
Ultimately, though remote, the US expects to use the inventive strategic inventory in response to a conventional or nuclear attack. OPLAN 8010 consists of various conventional and nuclear attack options. The latter are classified. OPLAN 8010 is a strategic plan that incorporates several elements of national power to exert pressure and gain strategic impact against specific opponents.
Incorrect perception of messages
This is perhaps the most heavily censored section of the entire strategic plan. You mention the risks of incorrect perception of opponents' messages. "Commanders will have to constantly and culturally evaluate an appropriate communication strategy. Regardless, all options must always be available. " The Principle of Deterrence is based on the balance of three scarce information and those covered by military secret. Sufficient information to scare the enemy.
US nuclear policy
The ultimate purpose of US nuclear weapons is the same as at the end of the 40 years: to discourage an armed attack against the United States and protect its allies. By definition, "nuclide assets are an instrument to prevent any kind of aggression against America's national and vital interests".
It is the concept of the political guarantee. It is the same that applies to the B-61 Tactical Nuclear Bomb in Europe. The B-61 should represent a strategic deterrent that is believed to be able to dissuade the same allies from developing home-made nuclear weapons. They are therefore understood as a US political guarantee, which holds property and discretion, to protect Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was conceived to logistically support the presence in Europe of the United States. We are talking about a strategy that comes directly from the Cold War. Shared responsibility for nuclear weapons is based on the solidarity of the NATO allies and the unity of intent to protect territorial integrity. But is the concept of tactical nuclear weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapon still valid?
There is no tactical nuclear weapon
The definition of "non-strategic nuclear weapons" is a relic of the Cold War. Depending on the scalar concept of a tactical asset, its use is theoretically considered isolated, limited, and proportional. However, as General John Hyten, commander of the US Strategic Command, said, "every nuclear weapon employed is strategic." This is due to the growing recognition that any use of nuclear power would have strategic consequences.
And it is under the strategic lens that their real purpose must be assessed, that is, to convince the opponent that they cannot achieve their objectives under penalty of devastating retaliation. This is deterrence, the primary purpose of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nation states that possess them. In April 2009, former President Barack Obama from Prague stated that the United States would take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. However, Obama also stated that "as long as these weapons hesitate, the United States will maintain an arsenal capable of deterring any opponent and guaranteeing the defense of allies". The primary requirement of US national security is the protection of its people, but as Obama recalled, the US nuclear and conventional umbrella spans over thirty states around the world. The concept of extended deterrence simply means that one state will provide security to the second state by dreading retaliation against a third party who may wish to attack it. It is a logical extrapolation of the theory of deterrence. Extended deterrence commits the United States to go to war with another great power to protect a more vulnerable state. When the United States chooses to grant extended deterrence to another state, that commitment includes all envisaged measures, including nuclear ones. Deterrence is essentially a psychological weapon active on the perceptions of the potential opponent, but it would lose its effectiveness without a credible capacity. Judgments cannot be determined by fashion, but the only positive benefit of nuclear weapons is their non-use.
A definition problem
The tactical term is very dangerous, since every nuclear weapon used is actually strategic. The effect of a tactical yield will be strategic. If someone attacked the United States with tactical nuclear weapons by definition, the answer would certainly be strategic and not tactical. The point is that overcoming the line, last passed in 1945, the response will be entrusted to thermonuclear retaliation. It is correct to make appropriate definitions. The six bases of Nato (Belgium (Kleine Brogel AB), Germany (Buchel AB), Italy (Aviano and Ghedi AB), the Netherlands (Volkel AB), and Turkey (Incirlik AB) host about 180 American nuclear bombs B61 Mod-3 , -4, -7, -10 The Italian bases of Ghedi and Aviano should host 30 from the 50 nuclear bombs B61 altogether. 180 tested hydrogen B61, according to the political concept of nuclear sharing, will all be converted to Mod version -12 And they're all strategic weapons.
source The Journal