(by Giuseppe Paccione) The conduct of war, corroborated by the aggression by Russia against Ukraine, causing enormous suffering to the civilian population and the destruction of public and private structures, even razing some Ukrainian cities to the ground, has been considered by the international community as falling within the context of a real war. This last word has always been hidden and rejected or avoided by the Muscovite authorities by replacing it with the expression special military operation, which can be framed in the sphere of violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter, which establishes the prohibition of resorting to jus ad bellum against territorial integrity or political independence in this case Ukrainian, member of the United Nations with international personality.
Language and the logic of the empire, a very dear concept to Vladimir Putin, are based on inequality and subordination, in the sense that it is impossible to have the same relations between the empire and its constituent parts on the same level, that is to say that there can be no room for war conflict within the empire, for the mere reason that the very concept of war presupposes equal status, for example, a state (or empire) is at war with another state (or empire). This point constitutes the rational point of President Putin, supported by the public media of the Russian Federation, according to which he insistently affirms that the West, the NATO et al I'm really at war. Ergo, Putin compares the Western bloc and its surroundings as enemies who have the same status (of empire) and with whom Russia wants to talk or fight.
One wonders, for example, what kind of war can there be with the Ukrainian state. In the logical sphere of empire, it cannot under all circumstances have one status equal to that of (imperial) Russia, indeed, Putin considers Ukraine as a colony and not as a sovereign state and, therefore, only a special military operation and that, compared to a war conflict, this operation does not involve parity of Ukraine with Russia. This concept, from the Russian point of view, uses the reasoning of the cd inequality as in the case where state authorities conduct a police or counter-terrorism operation thereby exercising their monopoly on the use of military coercion. The narration of thespecial military operation it is considered imperialistic precisely for the mere reason that it implies that the Russian state is using the armed tool within its domain, of which the Ukrainian state is only a part of Russia. What is written assumes a double language criterion, in the sense that, on the one hand, the Ukrainian state is technically an independent and separate sovereign state with its own central executive body; on the other, Moscow, in particular Putin, considers it a puppet or built country to art from some Western countries and, therefore, not recognized as a state entity, but how integral part of Russia. This is the justification, in the opinion of the Russian diplomacy, according to which Ukraine suffered absolutely no war attacks. Therefore, it can be seen how the Russians believe that intervening in Ukraine is not equivalent to an armed attack or an invasion but only to an operation on a territorial strip that belongs to it.
The Russian position in passing its conduct on Ukrainian territory covered by the special military operation has as its conjecture the use of the language of an internal police intervention and not of a war conflict against Ukraine. It is possible to see the Russian perspective of naming the use of its military troops in Chechnya, for example, considered as an operation to restore constitutional order during the first Chechen war conflict and counter-terrorist operation, in the second Chechen war, on the territory of the North Caucasus region, also adding the peace enforcement operation with the Russian invasion of Georgian territory and finally themilitary special operation against Ukraine. From this it can be inferred that the Russian government does not wage wars that can only be fought with equals and equals, but only conducts operations not involving the guidelines of a war.
The question arises as to whether all of this may reveal some point about the hostile Russian occupation on Ukrainian territory. First, according to the president Putin, direct negotiations with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky they have been reluctant, despite the Ukrainian president's request to open the negotiation path to find a peaceful solution, not only since the beginning of the armed conflict, but even before he was elected head of state by the Ukrainian people. The direct role of Ukraine in the negotiation negotiations would place on the same level in a symbolic way as Putin, who for the latter would be completely unthinkable and not tolerable to Russia, which considers itself an empire that must deal only with other empires and not with states. of little significance. At the most, the Russian president would be available to participate in the negotiation table with Ukraine only if these talks were in their substance an act of submissive humiliation of the Ukrainian president. Any other scenario would indicate the defeat of President Putin and the victory of his Ukrainian opponent and would also mean the destruction of the imperial narrative objective.
Second, by how strong and coherent the Russian imperialist narrative has become, Putin was already preparing to declare war to Ukraine. It is also becoming increasingly clear that declaring martial law and initiating mobilization is the only way for Moscow to continue the war, which however is not the logic within which the Kremlin government operates and, therefore, the relations of the 'intelligence seem to miss the point, in the sense that, not only would the declaration of war uniform the reason why the Russian professional army failed, but it would also lead the Ukrainian state to the figure of an equal opponent, which simpliciter it would ruin the whole imperialist narrative worked out by Putin in a careful and accurate way. Should the Russian president officially initiate a general mobilization or partial, then it would have to adapt to the rhetoric of facing the real enemy, who would arduously resolve Russian military and political issues.
Finally, I believe it is important that calls from Western civil society to their governments to enter into negotiations with the Kremlin should be curbed, although such requests could entail a strengthening of Putin's narrative and ambitions that Russia does not it is at war with Ukraine, but with the entire West.