Defense: China and the United States together for cybersecurity
The first cycle of Sino-US dialogues on cybersecurity has opened in Washington. "A step forward between the two countries in the application of a virtual security law but also a reason for the growth of bilateral cooperation and adequate management of the differences between the two parties," said a Chinese official. A problem that could prove to be a real scourge is that of threats to cyber security, which is increasingly growing and which could find an opening in the cooperation between the two countries. A topic that has been addressed in every official visit between the leaders of China and the United States and that will also be discussed on the occasion of Trump's arrival in China next month.
Insights
China's massive investment in cyberclips represents a major challenge for the United States, which on the one hand is losing the skeptic of a leading country in the field of cyber security, while exposing itself to the threats coming from Beijing.
However, despite the Asian giant's activism, the US Congress and the Federal Government have five great tools to make significant changes within their own national system.
These moves - as explained by US Cyber Command Jake Bebber in an analysis for the Center for International Maritime Security - are known as 'Rishikof of Big 5', named after Harvey Rishikof, chairman of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association.
The five axes in the sleeve include fiscal and fiscal laws, regulatory code, insurance premiums, litigation and international treaties.
A comprehensive and comprehensive answer to China's challenge to the US-led international system will require a mix of these 'winning cards' according to experts.
No change or alteration of politics in the Department of Defense in cyber operations, notes the analysis, will have "the same impact as these tools."
In detail, tax and budget laws, combined with legislation, can be structured to stimulate the resilience and security of the network (software security and hardware as a priority standard), not just among the infrastructure industries but also among the population as a whole, in order to include Internet gateway frontier gateways, small and medium-sized Internet service providers, and IT providers.
Since the Federal Government, the Department of Defense and Internal Security depend heavily on private industry and third party communications and IT providers, this will result in improved systems used by those who support national security .
For Bebber, the key question to answer is then: how can Congress promote network resilience and security standards, including supply chain protection, especially for those industry players who supply goods and services to the government?
If fiscal, fiscal and regulatory laws on the one hand could offer some incentive, they may also have 'counter'.
Controversies and insurance premiums may also have similar effects, both in promoting standards and practices and in discouraging the poor 'computer hygiene' and network security practices. Once again, according to the expert, the Congress must be able to alternate "stick and carrot" in the national security framework.
Capitol Hill could also address the issues of law and policy that "allow enemy states to exploit the US system to the detriment of the US".
According to Bebber, today, American universities and research institutions are, in Bebber's direction, the future leaders of China in the IT sector, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, information technology, cryptography, energy and quantum mechanics.
Most of these students will probably return to China to put their talents at the disposal of the Chinese government and the national military sector by designing systems that will put the US in trouble. American companies already hire and build Chinese computer engineers and set up research centers in China.
The American taxpayer, in practice, is the official - helping finance the growth and development of China's military and strategic cyber forces, as well as growth in the Chinese information technology industry.
With regard to the Defense Department in particular, Congress should work with the Pentagon to identify ways to train and equip cyber mission troops.
It will have to provide new tools to exploit to identify and recruit talented men and women and ensure that the nation can benefit from it in the long run, creating appropriate incentives to maintain high standards.
Finally, it will have to build a structured acquisition system. The armed forces today work using highly developed systems along with technologically obsolete and approximate systems.
This, notes the analysis, is obviously not an optimal framework and creates vulnerabilities in systems, risking missions and endangering human lives.
The Congress, the Department of Defense and the intelligence and security community, Bebber concludes, could work together to create a center for excellence in information and IT domination that can provide a detailed analysis of system-of-systems, tools analytical and development skills needed to operate and defend themselves in this domain.
Similar centers have been created in other areas such as the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center.
Source Cyber Affairs