(by Giuseppe Paccione and Massimiliano D'Elia) For months, with its assets, NATO has been in constant alarm and almost every day is measured against Russian provocations. Our Air Force planes are garrisoning the Baltic and on more than one occasion have had to intercept Russian fighters that had violated Alliance airspace.
Yesterday another challenge materialized in the seabed of the Baltic Sea where the gas pipelines that transported gas from Russia to Europe, the Nordstream 1 and 2, were targeted, aimed at transporting Russian gas directly to Germany along the route of the first Nord Stream gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which started leaking gas into the sea due to two major leaks in the pipelines. Immediately (without any substantial clue) there was talk of an alleged Russian sabotage by divers or even a submarine specialized in such activities. NATO's concern is not only addressed to gas pipelines but also to submarine cables for the internet which are mostly accidentally damaged but can be sabotaged for espionage, terrorism and hybrid warfare, especially in the Baltic Sea.
NATO therefore immediately activated the procedures it had already studied in events of this kind that are part of a broader strategy linked to the hybrid war so dear to Putin and his defense chief, General Valery Gerasimov. At the NATO headquarters in Brussels they talk about a typical case of hybrid warfare, which brings together the energy asset and the submarine force. Still at NATO, calm is invited even if the maritime commands of the Alliance have received the order to increase surveillance in sensitive areas and on potentially hostile military assets. Every Russian movement in the Baltic area will have to be monitored without losing an inch of military initiatives.
On the paternity of the sabotage, from the first checks, and on the States that possess such capabilities, Russia is the most suspected. Prudence in these cases is also maximum for the mere reason that the extremes for recalling Article 5 of the Treaty, which provides for the action of the forces of the Alliance in the event of an attack on one of the member countries, obviously preceded by the article 4 which determines the consultation. Assets considered strategic for the European Union have been attacked, but as analysts argue, perhaps it is better not to raise the bar of the conflict that from Ukraine could spread like wildfire all over the world. Another provocation of the current Tsar is the outcome of the plebiscitary referendum (farce) in Donbass where ninety percent of the population has chosen to join Russia. After the ratification of the Duma annexation decree, Donbass will effectively become the territory of the Russian Federation. The referendum was not recognized by the international community, even if following the voting stages there were over five hundred journalists who the Russians say are "independent". A referendum characterized by a shotgun leveled and made house by house with transparent ballot boxes and unfolded ballots. The United States, meanwhile, has promised Zelensky more funding and weapons.
The Submarine Cables, a strategic asset to be protected
There are about 400 submarine telecommunications cables connecting all continents, exchanging 95 percent of data globally. But who builds these "vital" arteries for world communications? One of the leading companies in the sector is Huawei. Chinese company, accused by the United States of spying on behalf of China by taking advantage of its contracts to implement 5G, the next generation cellular network, around the world.
In most cases, submarine cables are controlled by large telephone operators, who organize themselves into consortia to jointly support the costs of their installation and maintenance over time. Many operators are controlled directly by governments, or have historically close relationships with them, given that on their networks pass all kinds of data, including those for managing service networks and infrastructure. In recent times, large Internet companies such as Facebook and Google have started to make their own cables to enhance the services they offer to users. The traffic is routed on the submarine cables according to the needs of the moment, so rarely can you have complete control over the medium through which the information will pass.
The construction of 5G is closely linked to the expansion of the submarine cable network to connect the continents. Cell phone towers are naturally wired to the rest of the Internet and for the transmission of information over large distances, with oceans in between, satellites are not enough. High-capacity and high-speed networks will require increased bandwidth of submarine cables and the construction of new links.
An infrastructure, that of submarine cables, from which it passes between 95 and 99% of the world's Internet traffic and which conveys, every day, financial operations of over $ 10 trillion, enabling the circulation of data that allows the management of increasingly complex supply chains.
The cloud, video streaming services, 5G, the IoT, require more and more bandwidth: dependence on cables is set to increase the installation of new network segments breaks new records every year.
If in the period 2016-2020 an average of 67.000 kilometers of new cables every year, the estimate for the period 2021-2023 it will be 113.000 kilometers on average each year.
However, this infrastructure turns out to be fragile and exposed to multiple risks. The analysis of these risks is an activity that has only recently received the interest of the academic community, a phenomenon that Bueger and Liebetrau (2021) claim derives from a “triple invisibility” of submarine cables.
In statistical terms, the main cause of infrastructure damage is the accidental damage, about 40% of the total, attributable to activities such as trawling and anchoring, in particular near the coasts.
Il damage as a result of natural phenomena refers to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunami storms.
The cables carry a large amount of data, even sensitive and strategic, providing a great information advantage to those who can access them.
The risk is therefore lo espionage, accentuated by the ability to access the data of the companies or states that manage the cables but also by other actors who, under certain conditions, intercept the signal through specific receptors.
Measures that, however necessary, create new vulnerabilities: in particular, one cyber vulnerability and a vulnerability to terrorist attacks.
The importance of the cables would make this infrastructure one of the main objectives of hybrid warfare actions especially in regions, such as the Baltic Sea, where damage to a few nodes could compromise the communications of entire states.